IMAGE  EVALUATION 
TEST  TARGET  (MT-3) 


^ 


A 


^  ,<.% 


^'  ^W.<^ 


/ 


.V 

4^0 


A* 


^  4(g 


i/^ 


oS. 


^      A? 


/. 


^J^ 


^ 


^^ 


'/ 


II  I.I 

11.25 


mmm22 
2.0 


lU 

m 
lit 


I 

U    11.6 


Photographic 
_Sdencss 
CorporatioR 


93  WiST  MAIN  STMET 

WEBSTER,  N.Y.  14SM 

(716)  •72-4503 


CIHM/ICMH 

Microfiche 

Series. 


CIHIVI/ICMH 
Collection  de 
microfiches. 


Canadian  Institute  for  Historical  Microreproductions  /  Institut  Canadian  de  microreproductions  historiques 


<v^  i 


Technical  a.id  Bibliographic  Notas/Notoa  tachniquea  at  bibiiographiquaa 


Tha  Inatituta  haa  attamptad  to  obtain  tha  baat 
original  copy  availabia  for  filming.  Faaturaa  of  thia 
copy  which  may  ba  bibliographically  uniqua, 
which  may  altar  any  of  tha  imagaa  in  tha 
reproduction,  or  which  may  significantly  change 
tha  uaual  method  of  filming,  are  checked  below. 


D 

D 
D 
D 

n 

D 
D 
D 
D 

D 


D 


Coloured  covers/ 
Couverture  de  couleur 

Covers  damaged/ 
Couverture  endommagia 

Covers  restored  and/or  laminated/ 
Couverture  restaurte  et/ou  peiiiculde 

Cover  title  missing/ 

Le  titre  de  couverture  manque 

Coloured  maps/ 

Cartes  gAographiques  en  couleur 

Coloured  ink  (i.e.  other  than  blue  or  black)/ 
Encre  de  couleur  (i.e.  autre  que  bleue  ou  noire) 

Coloured  plates  and/or  illustrations/ 
Planchaa  et/ou  iilustrationa  en  couleur 

Bound  with  other  material/ 
Ralii  avec  d'autrea  documents 

Tight  binding  may  cause  ahadowa  or  distortion 
along  interior  margin/ 

La  re  liure  serr^e  peut  causer  de  I'ombre  ou  de  la 
distortion  le  long  de  la  marge  int^rieure 

Blank  leaves  added  during  restoration  may 
appear  within  the  text.  Whenever  possible,  these 
have  been  omitted  from  filming/ 
II  se  peut  que  certain3a  pagea  blanches  ajouttes 
lors  d'une  restauration  apparaissent  dana  le  texte, 
mala,  loraqua  ceia  Atait  poaaible,  cea  pages  n'ont 
pas  4t6  filmiea. 

Additional  commenta:/ 
Commentairea  supplAmentaires: 


L'Institut  a  microfilm^  le  meilleur  exemplaire 
qu'il  lui  a  AtA  poaaible  de  ae  procurer.  Lea  dAtaila 
de  cet  exemplaire  qui  aont  paut-Atre  uniquea  du 
point  da  vue  bibliographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier 
une  image  reproduite,  ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une 
modification  dana  la  mithode  normale  de  filma^a 
sont  indiquAa  ci*deaaoua. 


D 
D 
D 


n 

D 
D 

n 


Coloured  pagea/ 
Pagea  de  couleur 

Pagea  damaged/ 
Pagea  andommag^ea 

Pagea  reatored  and/or  laminated/ 
Pagea  reataurAea  et/ou  pellicultea 

Pagea  diacoloured,  atainad  or  foxed/ 
Pages  d6color6es,  tachetiea  ou  piquAea 

Pagea  detached/ 
Pagea  d^tachtea 

Showthrough/ 
Transparence 

Quality  of  print  variea/ 
Qualit*  inigale  de  I'lmpreaaion 

Includea  supplementary  material/ 
Comprond  du  materiel  auppl^mentaire 

Only  edition  available/ 
Seule  Edition  diaponible 

Pagea  wholly  or  partially  obacured  by  errata 
aiipa,  tiaauae,  etc.,  have  been  refilmed  to 
enaure  the  beat  poaaible  image/ 
Lea  pagea  totalement  ou  partiellement 
obacurciaa  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une  pelure, 
etc.,  ont  M  filmtea  d  nouveau  de  fa^on  A 
obtenir  la  mellleure  image  poaaible. 


T 
t( 


T 

P 
o 
fi 


O 
b 
t» 
si 
o 
fii 
si 

01 


! 

w 

M 

dl 
er 
b« 

rl| 
re 
m 


This  item  is  filmed  at  the  reduction  ratio  checked  below/ 

Ce  document  eat  film*  au  taux  de  rMuction  indlqu*  ci-deaaoua 

10X                           14X                            18X                           22X 

26X 

30X 

^ 

i 

7 

12X 

16X 

20X 

24X 

28X 

32X 

The  copy  fllmsd  h«r«  hm  b—n  raproducad  thankt 
to  tho  gonorotity  of: 

Library  of  tha  Public 
Archivas  of  Canada 

Tha  imagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  bast  quality 
possibia  considaring  tha  condition  and  lagibiiity 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  kaaping  with  tha 
filming  contract  spacif icationa. 


Original  copias  in  printad  pa;  ar  covars  ara  fllmad 
baginning  with  tha  front  covar  and  anding  on 
tha  last  paga  with  a  printad  or  illuatratad  impraa- 
sion,  or  tha  back  covar  whan  appropriata.  All 
othar  original  copiaa  ara  fllmad  baginning  on  tha 
first  paga  with  a  printad  or  illuatratad  impraa- 
sion,  and  anding  on  tha  last  paga  with  a  printad 
or  illuatratad  impraaaion. 


Tha  last  racordad  frama  on  aach  microficha 
shall  contain  tha  symbol  — »>  (moaning  "CON- 
TINUED"), or  tha  symbol  y  (moaning  "END"), 
whichovar  applias. 


L'axamplaira  filmA  fut  raproduit  grAca  A  la 
gAnAroaitA  da: 

La  bibliothiqua  das  Archivas 
publiquas  du  Canada 

Las  imagas  suivantas  ont  AtA  raprodultas  avac  la 
plus  grand  soin,  compta  tanu  da  la  condition  at 
da  la  nattat«  da  l'axamplaira  film«,  at  an 
conformity  avac  las  conditions  du  contrat  da 
filmaga. 

Las  axamplairas  originaux  dont  la  couvartura  an 
papiar  aat  imprimte  sont  filmto  an  commandant 
par  la  pramiar  plat  at  9n  tarminant  soit  par  la 
darnlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'impraaaion  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  la  sacond 
plat,  aalon  la  cas.  Tous  las  autras  axamplairas 
originaux  sont  filmAs  an  commanpant  par  la 
pramlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  amprainta 
d'impraaaion  ou  d'illustration  at  an  tarminant  par 
la  darnlAra  paga  qui  comporta  una  talla 
amprainta. 

Un  das  symbolas  suivants  apparaftra  sur  la 
darnlAra  imaga  da  chaqua  microficha.  salon  la 
cas:  la  aymbola  -^>  signifia  "A  SUIVRE",  la 
symbols  V  signifia  "FIN". 


IMaps,  platas.  charts,  ate,  may  ba  fllmad  at 
diffarant  raduction  ratios.  Thosa  too  larga  to  ba 
antiraly  includad  in  ona  axpo^ura  ara  filmad 
beginning  in  tha  uppar  laft  hand  cornar,  laft  to 
right  and  top  to  bottom,  aa  many  framas  as 
raquirad.  Tha  following  diagrams  illuatrata  tha 
mathod: 


Las  cartas,  planchas,  tableaux,  ate,  pauvant  Atre 
filmAa  A  das  taux  da  rAduction  diff Arants. 
Lorsqua  la  document  est  trop  grand  pour  Atre 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clichA,  il  est  filmA  A  pdrtir 
de  I'angle  supArieur  gauche,  de  gauche  A  droite, 
et  de  haut  en  bas,  an  prenant  la  nombre 
d'imagas  nAcessaira.  Las  diagrammas  suivants 
illustrant  la  mAthoda. 


1 

2 

3 

i 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

.i 


*      J, 

i 


Ji 


( 


y  Ay  ' 


'TfPPJWWm^BfW'lilW^liWPB^IWIflP'flPfW''^^ 


V  ■"''  iv-^'"^"^' 


^         SUPPLEMENT 

TO  THE 

Boston  Weekly  Messenger. 


'^7  ..     v^^  /     ■    ■■ 


7    1 


AN 


ADDRESS 


OF 


Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives 


OP    THE 


CONGRESS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 


TO  fHEIR 


)'  i 


CONSTITUEJ^TS, 


ON  THE  SUBJECT 


or    THE 


WAR  WITH  GREAT  BRITAIN. 


\  !'i 


\ 


I  . 


■•?s% 


'    .» 


I    0' 

I  i 


I    i 


The  under aigned  Members  of  tlte  House  of  Rcfireacntaliveni  to  their 

Jie^ficctive  Constituents, 


A  Republic  has  for  its  basis  the  capacity  and  right  of  the  people 
10  govern  themselves.  A  main  principle  of  u  representative  repub- 
lic is  the  responsibility  of  the  representatives  to  their  constituents. 
Freedom  and  publicity  of  debate  are  essential  to  tlic  preservation  of 
such  forms  of  government.  Every  arbitrary  abridgement  of  the  right 
of  speech  in  representatives,  is  a  direct  infringement  of  the  liberty 
of  the  people  ;  every  unnecessary  concealment  of  their  proceedings 
an  approximation  towards  tyranny.  When,  by  systematic  rules,  a 
majority  takes  to  itself  the  right,  at  its  pleasure,  of  limiting  speech, 
or  denying  it  altogether ;  when  secret  sessions  multiply  ;  and  in 
proportion  to  tlve  importance  of  questions,  is  the  studious  conceal- 
ment of  debate,  a  people  may  be  assured,  that,  such  practices  con- 
tinuing, their  freedom  is  but  short-lived. 

Reflections,  such  as  these,  have  been  forced  upon  the  attention  of 
the  undersigned,  Members  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  the 
United  States,  by  the  events  of  the  present  session  of  Congress. 
They  have  witnessed  a  principle,  adopted  as  the  law  of  the  Plouse, 
by  which,  under  a  novel  application  of  the  previous  question,  a  power 
is  assumed  by  the  majority  to  deny  the  privilege  of  speech,  at  any 
stage,  and  under  any  circumstances  of  debate.  And  recently,  by  an 
unprecedented  assumption,  the  right  to  give  reasons  for  an  original 
motion,  has  been  made  to  depend  upon  the  will  of  the  majority. 
.  Principles  more  hostile  than  these  to  tlie  existence  of  representa- 
tive liberty  cannot  easily  be  conceived.  It  is  not,  however  on  tlicse 
accounts,  weighty  as  they  are,  that  the  undersigned  have  undertaken 
this  address.  A  subject  of  higher  and  more  immediate  importance 
impels  thein  to  the  present  duty. 

The  momentous  question  of  war,  with  Great  Britain,  is  decided. 
On  this  topic,  so  vital  to  your  interests,  the  right  of  public  debate,  in 
the  face  of  the  world,  and  especially  of  their  constituents,  has  been 
denied  to  your  representatives.  They  have  been  called  into  secret 
session,  on  this  most  interesting  of  all  your  public  relations,  althoup;h 
the  circumstances  of  the  time  and  of  the  nation  alFordcd  no  one  rea- 
son for  secrecy,  unless  it  be  found  in  the  apprehension  of  the  effect 
of  public  debate  on  public  opinion ;  or  of  public  opinion  on  the  re- 
sult of  the  vote. 

Except  the  message  of  the  President  of  the  Ui.ited  States,  which 


^ 


,1 

1.1 


'iii'ji   i .'.  if  Ff^'..' 


iif' 


it  I 

I   I 


IS  now  before  the  public,  nothing  confidential  was  communicated. 
1  hat  message  contained  no  fact,  not  previously  known.  No  one  rea- 
son for  war  was  intimated,  but  such  as  was  of  a  nature  public  and 
notorious.  The  intention  to  wage  war  and  invade  Canada  had  been 
long  since  openly  avowed.  The  object  of  hostile  menace  had  been 
ostentatiously  announced.  The  inadequacy  of  both  our  army  and 
navy  lor  successful  invasion,  and  the  insufficiency  of  the  fortifications 
for  the  security  of  our  seaboard,  were,  every  where,  known.  Yet  the 
doors  of  Congress  were  shut  upon  the  people.  They  have  been 
carcfuiry  kept  in  ignorance  of  the  progress  of  measures,  until  the 
purposes  of  administration  were  consummated,  and  the  fate  of  the 
country  sealed.  In  a  sifuation  so  extraordinary,  the  undersigned 
have  deemed  it  their  difty  by  no  act  of  theirs  to  sanction  a  proceeding 
so  novel  and  arbitrary.  On  the  contrary,  they  made  every  attempt 
m  their  power  to  attain  publicity  for  their  proceedings.  All  such 
attempts  were  vain.  When  this  momentous  subject  was  stated,  as 
for  debate,  they  demanded  that  the  doors  should  be  opened. 

This  being  refused,  they  declined  discussion ;  being  perfectly  con- 
vinced, from  indications  too  plain  to  be  misunderstood,  that,  in  the 
house,  all  argument,  with  closed  dooi«s,  was  hopel^.ss;  and  that  any 
act,  giving  implied  validity  to  so  flagrant  an  abuse  of  power,  would 
be  little  less  than  treachery  to,the  essential  rights  of  a  free  people. 
In  the  situation  to  which  the  undersigned  have  thus  been  reduced, 
they  are  compelled  reluctantly  to  resort  to  this  public  declaration  of 
^ch  views  m  the  state  and  relations  of  the  country,  as  determined 
their  judv;ment  and  vote  upop  the  question  of  war.  A  measure  of 
this  kind  has  appeared  to  the  undersigned  to  be  more  imperiously 
demanded,  by  the  circumstance  of  a  mesiiage  and  manifesto  being 
prepared,  and  cir  tilated  at  public  expencc,  in  which  the  causes  fop 
War  were  enumerated  and  thft  motives  for  it  concentrated,  in  a  man- 
ner suited  to  agitate  and  influence  the  public  mind.  In  executing 
this  task,  it  will  be  the  study  of  the  undersigned  to  reconcile  the 
great  duty  they  owe  to  the  people  with  that  constitutional  respect 
which  is  due  to  the  administrators  of  public  concerns. 

In  commencing  this  view  of  our  afl'airs,  the  undersigned  would 
fail  in  duty  to  themselves,  did  they  refrain  from  recurring  to  the 
course,  in  relation  td  public  measures,  which  they  adopted  and  have 
undeviatingly  pursaed  from  the  commencement  of  this  long  and 
eventful  session  ;  in  which  they  deliberately  sacrificed  every  minor 
consideration  bo,  what  they  deemed,  the  best  interests  of  the  country. 

For  a  succession  of  years  the  undersigned  have  from  principle  dis- 
approved a  scries  cff  restrictions  upon  commerce,  according  to  their 
estimation,  insufficient  as  respected  foreign  nations,  and  injurious* 
chiefly,  to  ourselves.  Success,  in  the  system,  had  become  identified 
with  the  pride,  the  character  and  the  hope  of  our  cabinet.  As  is  natural 
with  men,  who  have  a  great  stake  depending  on  the  success  of  a  fa- 
vourite theory,  pertinacity  seemed  to  increase  as  its  hopelessness  be- 
came apparent.  As  the  insufficiency  of  this  system  could  not  be  ad- 
mitted, by  its  advocates,  without  insuring  its  abandonment,  ill 
success  was  curefully  atjribirted  to   tht;  inflwence  of  oppositiont 


f" 


licatcd. 

ne  rea- 

ic  and 

id  been 

d  been 

my  and 

cations 

Yet  the 

been 

mil  the 

of  the 

signed 

ceding 

Utempt 

1  such 

ted,  as 


To  thLn  cause  tlie  people  were  taught  to  charge  its  suctcsstfc  faH- 
ures,  and  not  to  its  intrinsic  imbecility.  In  this  state  of  things  the 
un  lersigned  deemed  it  proper,  to  take  away  all  apology  for  adher- 
rnce  to  this  oppressive  system.  They  vere  desirous,  ut  a  period  so 
critical  in  puhlick  alTairs,  as  far  as  was  consistent  with  the  indepen- 
dence of  opinion,  to  contribute  to  the  restoration  of  harmony  in  the 
publick  councils,  and  concord  among  the  people.  And  if  any  advan- 
tage could  be  thus  obtained  in  our  foreign  relations,  the  under- 
signed, beiiig  engaged  in  no  purpose  of  personal  or  party  advance- 
TQcnt,  would  rejoice  in  such  an  occurrence. 

The  course  of  public  measures  also,  at  the  opening  of  the  ses- 
sion, gave  hope  that  an  enlarged  and  enlightened  system  of  defence, 
with  provision  for  security  of  our  maritime  rights,  was  about  to  be 
commenced,  a  purpose  which,  wherever  found,  they  deemed  it  their 
duty  to  foster,  by  giving,  to  any  system  of  measures,  thus  compre- 
hensive, as  unobstructed  a  course  as  was  consistent  with  their  gener- 
al sense  of  publick  duty.  After  a  courso  of  policy,  thus  libecgt  and 
conciliatory,  it  was  cause  of  regret  that  a  communication  should 
have  been  purchased  by  an  unprecedented  expenditure  of  secret  ser- 
vicp  money;  and  used,  by  thfi  chief  magistrate,  to  disseminate  sus- 
picion apd  jealousy;  and  to  ex<^ite  resentment  among  the  citizens, 
by  suggesting  imputations  against  a  portion  of  them,  as  unmerited 
by  their  patriotism,  as  unwarranted  by  evidence. 

It  has  always  been  the  opinion  of  the  undersigned,  that  a  system  of 
peace  was  the  policy,  which  most  comported  with  the  character, 
condition,  and  interest  of  the  United  States  ;  that  their  remoteness 
from  the  theatre  of  contest,  in  Europe,  was  their  peculiar  felicity,  and 
that  nothmg  but  a  necessity,  absolutely  imperious,  should  induce 
them  to  enter  as  parties  into  wars,  in  which  every  consideration  of 
virtue  and  policy  seems  to  be  forgotten,  under  the  overbearing  sway 
of  rapacity  and  ambition.  There  is  a  new  era  in  human  affairs.— 
The  European  Avorld  is  convulsed.  The  advantages  of  our  situation 
are  peculiar.  "  Why  quit  our  own  to  stand  upon  foreign  ground  ? 
Why,  by  interweaving  our  destiny  with  that  of  any  part  of  Europe, 
entangle  our  peace  and  prosperity  in  the  toils  of  European  ambition, 
rivalship,  interest,  humour,  or  caprice  ?"* 

In  addition  to  the  many  moral  and  prudential  considerations,  which 
should  deter  thoughtful  men  from  hastening  into  the  perils  of  such 
a  war,  there  were  some  peculiar  to  the  United  States,  resulting  from 
the  texture  of  the  government,  and  the  political  relations  of  the  peo- 
ple. A  form  of  government,  in  no  small  degree  experimental,  com- 
posed of  powerful  and  independent  sovereignties,  associated  in  rela- 
tions, some  of  which  are  critical,  as  well  as  novel,  should  not  be  has- 
tily precipitated  into  situations,  calculated  to  put  to  trial  the  strength 
of  the  moral  bond,  by  which  they  are  united.  Of  all  stateg,  that  of 
war  is  most  likely  to  call  into  activity  the  passions,  which  arc  hostile 
iand  dangerous  to  such  a  form  of  government.  Time  is  yet  impor- 
tant to  o.ur  country  to  settle  and  mature  its  recent  institu^aons.     A- 

*  AVashington. 


: 


'ji 


V 


l( 


"4, 


bove  all)  it  at>i)oarcd  to  the  undersigned,  from  h'n^m  not  to  be  tnititak* 
on,  that  if  wc  entered  upon  this  war,  we  did  it  as  a  divided  people ; 
not  onl^from  sense  of  the  inadequacy  of  our  means  to  success,  but 
from  moral  and  political  objections  of  great  weight,  and  very  general 
influence. 

It  appears  to  the  undersigned,  that  the  wrongs  of  which  the  Unit- 
ed States  have  to  complain,  although  in  some  aspects  very  grievous 
to  our  interests,  and,  in  many,  humiliating  to  our  pride,  were  yet  of  a 
nature,  which,  in  die  present  state  of  the  world,  either  would  not  jus- 
tWy  war,  or  which  war  would  not  remedy.  Thus,  for  instance},  the 
hovering  of  British  vessels  upon  our  coasts,  and  the  occasional  in- 
sults to  our  ports,  imperiously  demanded  such  asystcmatick  applica- 
tioo  of  harbour  and  sea-coast  defence,  aa  would  repel  suoh  aggixs- 
fiions ;  but,  in  no  light,  can  they  be  considered  as  making  a  resort  to 
war,  at  the  present  time,  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  either  ne- 
cessary, or  expedient.  So  also,  with  respect  to  the  Indian  war,  of  the 
origin  of  which  but  very  imperfect  information  has  as  yet  been  giv- 
en to  the  publick.  Without  any  express  act  of  Congress,  an  expedi- 
tion was  last  year  set  on  foot  and  prosecuted  into  the  Indian  territo- 
ry, which  had  been  relinquished  by  treaty  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States.  And  now  we  are  told  about  the  agency  of  British  traders, 
as  to  Indian  hostilities.  It  deserves  consideration,  whether  there 
has  been  such  provident  attention,  as  would  have  been  proper  to  re- 
move any  cause  of  complaint,  either  real  or  imaginary,  which  the 
Indians  might  allege,  and  to  secure  their  friendship.  With  all  the 
sympathy  and  anxiety  excited  by  the  state  of  that  frontier,  impor- 
tant as  it  may  be  to  apply  adequate  means  of  protection  against  the 
Indians,  how  is  its  safety  ensured  by  a  declaration  of  war,  wliich  adds 
the  British  to  the  number  of  enemies  ? 

As  "  a  decent  respect  to  the  opinions  of  mankind"  has  not  induced 
the  two  houses  of  Congress  to  concur  in  declaring  the  reasons,  or 
motives,  for  their  enacting  a  declaration  of  war,  the  undersigned 
and  tlie  public  are  left  to  search,  else  where,  for  causes  either  real  or 
ostensible.  If  we  are  to  consider  the  President  of  the  United  Stales, 
and  the  committee  of  the  house  of  Representatives  on  foreign  rela- 
tions, as  speaking  on  this  solemn  occasion  *or  Congress,  the  United 
States  have  three  principal  topics  of  complaint  agcinst  Great-Bri- 
tain.    Impressments;— blockades;— ^nd  orders  in  council. 

Concerning  the  subject  of  impressment,  the  undersigned  sympa- 
thize with  our  unfortunate  seamen,  the  victims  of  this  abuse  of  pow- 
er, and  participate  in  the  national  sensibility  on  their  account.  They 
do  not  conceal  from  themselves  both  its  importance  and  its  difRcuIty  ; 
and  they  are  well  aAvare  how  stubborn  is  the  will,  and  how  blind  the 
vision  of  powerful  nations,  when  great  interests  grow  into  controver- 
sy. 

But  before  a  resort  to  war  for  such  interests,  a  moral  nation  will 
consider  what  is  just,  and  a  wise  nation  what  is  expedient.  If  thc 
exercise  of  any  right  to  the  full  extent  of  its  abstract  nature,  be  in- 
consistent with  the  safety  of  another  nation,  morality  seems  to  re- 
quire that,  in  practice,  its  exercise   should  in  this  respect  be  mocfi- 


(      m 


»plo; 
i,  but 
ncrul 


ficd.     If  it  be  proposed  to  vindicate  uuy  right  by  war,  wifsdom  (It 
iTiandH  tliat  it  should  be  of  a  nature  by  wiir  to  be  obtained.      The  in- 
terests connected  with  the  subject  of  impressment  are  umiuesiiona- 
bly  great  to  both  nations  ;  and  in  the  full  extent  of  abitrati  ri^ht  as 
asserted  by  each,  perhaps  irreconcilable. 

The  government  of  the  United  States  asserts  the  broad  principle 
that  the  flag  of  their  merchant  vessels  shall  protect  the  mariners. 
This  privilege  is  claimed,  although  every  person  on  board,  except 
rhe  captain,  may  be  an  alien. 

The  British  government  asserts  that  the  allegiance  of  their  sub- 
jects is  inalienable  in  time  of  war,  and  that  their  seamen,  found  on 
the  sea,  the  common  highway  of  nations,  shall  not  be  protected  by 
the  flag  of  private  merciumt  vessels. 

The  undersigned  deem  it  unneccitsary  here  to  discuss  the  question 
of  the  American  claim,  for  the  immunity  of  their  fla^j.  But  tlicy 
cannot  refrain  from  viewing  it  as  a  principle,  of  a  nature  very  broad 
and  comprehensive  ;  to  the  abuse  of  which  the  temptations  are 
strong  and  numerous.  And  they  do  maintain,  that  before  the  ca- 
lamities of  war  in  viiulication  of  such  a  principle  be  incurred,  all  th« 
means  of  negociation  should  bo  exhausted,  and  that  aldo  every  prac- 
ticable attempt  should  be  made  to  regulate  the  exercise  of  the  right ; 
so  that  the  acknowledged  injury,  resulting  to  other  nations,  should 
be  checked,  if  not  prevented.  They  are  clearly  of  opinion  that  the 
peace  of  this  happy  and  rising  community  should  not  be  abandoned 
for  the  sake  of  aflPording  facilities  to  cover  French  propcr'ty  ;  or  to 
eiYkploy  British  seamen. 

The  claim  of  Great  Bvitain  to  the  services  of  her  seamen  is  neither 
novel,  nor  peculiar.  The  doctrine  of  allegiance  for  which  she  con- 
tends is  common  to  all  ths  governments  of  Europe.  France,  as 
well  as  England,  has  maintained  it  for  centuries.  Both  nations 
claim,  in  time  of  war,  the  services  of  their  subjects.  Both  by  de- 
crees forbid  their  entering  into  foreign  employ.  Both  recall  them 
by  proclamation. 

No  man  can  doubt  that,  in  the  present  state  of  the  French  marine, 
if  American  merchant  vessels  were  met  at  sea,  having  French  sea- 
men on  board,  France  would  take  them.  Will  any  man  believe  that 
the  United  States  would  go  to  war  against  France  on  this  account  ? 

For  very  obvious  reasons,  this  principle  occasions  little  collision 
with  France,  or  with  any  other  nation,  except  England.  With  the 
English  nation,  the  people  of  the  J{Jnited  States  are  closely  assim- 
ilated)  in  blood,  language,  intercourse,  habits,  dress,  manners  and 
character.  When  Britain  is  at  >var  and  tbe  United  States  neutral, 
the  merchant  service  of  the  United  States  holds  out  to  British  sea- 
men temptations  almost  irresistable  ; — high  wages  and  peaceful  em- 
ploy, instead  of  low  wages  and  war-service  : — safety  itt  lieu  of  haz- 
ard ;— entire  independence,  in  the  place  of  qualified  servitude. 

That  England,  whose  situation  is  insular,  who  is  engaged  in  a  wai- 
apparently  for  existence,  whose  seamen  are  her  bulwark,  should  look 
upon  the  effect  of  our  principle  ujjon  her  safety  witli  jealousy,  is 
iucvitable ;  aijd  that  she  will  not  hazard  i!»<;  practicAl  coiiS'iquenccs 


;r 


m 


4 


!     f 


•;l- 


I II 


m 


of  U«  unrej^uhted  exercise,  is  certain.  The  cjucstioii,  therefore, 
presented,  directly,  for  the  decision  of  the  thougiitftil  uitd  virtuous 
mind,  in  thin  country  is— •whetltcr  war  for  such  an  abstract  ri(<;ht  be 
justifiable, before  attempting  to  guard  against  its  injurious  tendency 
by  legislative  regulation,  in  failure  of  treaty. 

A  dubious  right  should  bo  advanced  with  hesitation.  An  extreme 
right  should  be  asserted  with  discretion.  Moral  duty  requires,  that 
a  nation,  before  it  appeals  to  arms,  should  have  been,  not  only  true 
to  itself,  but  that  it  should  have  failed  in  no  duty  to  others.  If  the 
exercise  of  a  right,  in  an  unregulated  manner,  be  in  effect  a  stand«^ 
ing  invitationlo  the  subjects  of  a  foreign  power  to  become  deserters 
and  traitors,  is  it  no  injury  to  that  power  I 

Certainly,  moral  obligation  demands  that  the  right  of  flag,  like  a!t 
other  human  rights,  should  be  so  used,  as  that,  while  it  protects  what 
is  our  own,  it  should  not  injure  what  is  another's.  In  a  practical 
view,  and  so  long  as  the  right  of  flag  is  restrained  by  no  regard  to  the 
undeniable  interests  of  others,  a  war  on  account  of  impressments,  is 
only  a  war  for  the  right  of  employing  British  seamen  on  board 
American  merchant  vessels. 

The  claim  of  Great  Britain  pretends  to  no  further  extent,  than  to 
take  British  seamen  from  private  merchant  vessels.  In  the  exercise 
of  this  claim,  her  officers  take  American  seamen,  and  foreign  sea- 
men, in  the  American  scrvioe ;  and  although  she  disclaims  such  a- 
buses,  and  proffers  redress,  when  known,  yet  undoubtedly  grievous 
injuries  have  resulted  to  the  seamen  of  the  United  State's.  But  the 
question  is,  can  war  be  proper  for  such  cause,  before  all  hope  of  rea- 
sonable accommodation  has  failed  ?  Even  after  the  extinguishment 
of  such  hope,  can  it  be  proper,  until  our  own  practice  be  so  regulated 
as  to  remove,  in  such  foreign  nation,  any  reasonable  apprehension  of 
ir.j'iry  ? 

Tlie  undersigned  are  clearly  of  opinion  that  the  employmciii  of 
British  seamen,  in  the  merchant  service  of  the  United  States,  is  as 
little  reconcilcablc  with  the  permanent,  as  the  present  interest  of  the 
United  States.  The  encouragement  of  foreign  seamen  is  the  dis- 
couragement of  the  native  American. 

The  duty  of  government  towards  this  valuable  class  of  men  is 
not  only  to  protect,  but  to  patronize  them.  And  this  cannot  be 
done  more  effectually  than  by  securing  to  American  citizens  the 
privileges  of  American  navigation. 

The  question  of  impressment,  like  every  other  question  relative 
to  commerce,  lias  been  treated  in  such  a  manner,  that  what  was 
possessed  is  lost,  without  obtaining  what  was  sought.  Pretensions, 
tight  in  theory,  and  important  in  interest,  urged,  without  due  con- 
j»ideration  of  our  relative  power,  have  eventuated  in  a  practical 
abandonment,  both  of  what  we  hoped  and  what  we  enjoyed.  In  at- 
tempting to  spread  our  flag  over  foreigners,  its  distinctive  charac- 
ter has  been  lost  to  our  owncitize  ns. 

The  American  seaman,  whose  interest  it  is  to  have  no  competi- 
tors in  his  employment,  is  sacrificed,  that  British  seamen  may  hive 
•qu<al  privileges  with  himself. 


Lvtt  since  the  United  Statcn  Imvc  bcrn  a  nation,  tlii>  subject  Las 
been  a  mutter  of  mmplaint  nnd  ncgoliution  ;  and  every  fcinicr  ad- 
ministration iiave  u'uatcd  it,  according  to  its  ulivious  nature,  as  a 
subject  rather  for  arriin(;cnicnl  tlian  for  war.  It  existed  in  the 
time  of  Wasl)in(rton,  yet  tbis  father  of  bis  country  recommended  no 
such  resort.  It  cxistiul  ir  ihu  time  of  Adams,  yet,  notwithstanding 
the  /eal  in  support  of  our  miiriiimc  rights,  which  distinguished 
I/is  administration,  war  was  novor  suggested  by  him  astiie  remedy. 
During  the  eight  years  Mr.  JciTcrson  stood  at  the  helm  of  affairs,  it 
Hiill  continued  a  subject  of  controversy  and  negotiation  ;  but  it  was 
never  made  a  cause  for  war.  It  was  reserved  for  the  present  admin- 
istration to  pres*}  this  topic  to  the  extreme  and  most  drcatlful  resort 
of  nations  ;  alihuugh  Englund  has  olTicially  disavowed  the  right  of 
impressment,  us  it  respects  native  citizens,  and  an  arrangement 
might  well  be  made  consistent  with  tlie  fair  pretensions  of  such  as 
are  naturalized. 

That  tlie  real  state  of  tiiis  miestion  may  be  understood,  tbe  under- 
signed recur  to  the  following  tacts  as  supported  by  official  documents. 
Mr.  King,  when  minister  in  England,  obtained  a  disavowal  of  the 
British  government  of  the  right  to  impress  "  American  seamen," 
naturalised  as  well  as  native,  on  the  high  ieau.  An  arrangement 
had  advanced  nearly  to  a  conclusion,  upon  this  basis,  and  was  brok- 
en off  only  because  Great  Britain  insisted  to  retain  the  right  on  ^'  the 
narrow  seas."  What,  however,  was  the  opinion  of  the  American 
minister,  on  the  probability  of  an  arrangement,  appears  from  the 
public  documents,  communicated  to  congress  in  the  session  of  18U8| 
as  stated  by  Mr.  Madison  in  these  words,  "  at  the  moment  the  arti- 
'<  cles  were  expected  to  be  signed,  an  exception  of  "  the  narrow 
"  seas"  was  urged  and  insisted  on  by  Lord  St.  Vincents,  and  being 
"  utterly  inadmissible  on  our  part,  the  negotiation  was  abandoned." 

Mr.  King  seems  to  be  of  opinion,  however,  "  that,  with  more  time 
"  than  was  left  him  for  the  experiment,  the  objection  might  have 
"  been  overcome."  What  time  was  left  Mr.  King  for  the  experi- 
ment, or  whether  any  was  ever  made,  has  not  been  disclosed  to  the 
public.  Mr.  King,  soon  after  returned  to  America  :  It  is  manifest 
from  Mr.  King's  expression  that  he  was  limited  in  point  of  time,  and 
it  is  equally  clear  that  his  opinion  was,  that  an  adjustment  could  take 
place.  That  Mr.  Madison  was  also  of  the  same  opinion  is  demon- 
strated by  his  letters  to  Messrs.  Monroe  and  Pinkncy,  dated  the  3d 
of  February,  1807,  in  which  he  uses  these  expressions.  "  I  take  it 
«  for  granted  that  you  have  not  failed  to  make  due  use  of  the  ar- 
"  rangement  concerted  by  Mr.  King  with  Lord  Ilawksbury,  in  the  year 
"  1802,  for  settling  the  question  of  impressment.  On  that  occasion 
"  and  under  that  adminialralion  the  British  /iri?ici/ilc  tvas  fairly  rc- 
"  nounced  in  favor  of  the  right  ofourflagy  Lord  Hanukaburi/  having 
•*  agreed  to  firohibit  imiireaamcnts  on  the  high  aeas"  and  Lord  St. 
'*  Vincents  requiring  nothing  more  than  an  exception  of  the  narrow 
^'  seas,  an  exception  resting  on  the  obsolete  claim  of  Great  Britain 
*'  to  some  peculiar  dominion  over  thcn\."  Here  then  we  have  a  full 
acknowlcdj'jmi'nt  fl,ut  Groat  Britain   vvas  nilling   te  renounce   the 


. 


1] 


m 


<•-   ..    .'T.i.wfii 


IG 


II 


right  oi'  inipi'cssmcitl,  oit  ilic  higli  seas,  in  i'uvor  ul'  our  Aug  ;-~that 
she  was  anxious  to  arrange  the  subject. 

It  further  appears  that  the  British  ministry  called  for  an  interview 
with  Messrs.  Monroe  and  Pinkncy,  on  this  topic  ;  that  they  stated 
the  nature  of  the  claim,  the  King's  prerogative  ;  that  they  had  con- 
sulted 'he  crown  officers  and  the  board  of  admiralty,  who  a^l  concur- 
red in  sentiment,  that  under  the  circumstances  of  the  nation,  the  re- 
linquishment of  the  right  was  a  measure,  which  the  government 
could  not  adopt,  without  taking  on  itself  a  responsibility,  which  no 
ministry  would  be  willing  to  meet,  however  pressing  the  exigency 
might  be.  They  offered,  however,  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  to 
pass  laws  making  it  peual  for  British  commanders  to  impress  Amer- 
ican citizens,  on  board  of  American  vessels,  on  the  high  seas,  if  A- 
merica  would  pass  a  law,  making  it  penal  for  the  officers  of  the  U- 
nited  States  to  grant  certificates  of  citizenship  to  British  subjects — 
This  will  be  found,  in  the  same  documents,  in  a  letter  from  Messrs. 
Monroe  and  Pinkney  to  Mr.  Madison,  dated  1 1th  of  November,  1806. 
Under  t.'ieir  peremptory  instructions,  this  proposition,  on  the  part  of 
Great  Biitain,  could  not  be  acceded  to  by  our  ministers.  Such, 
however,  was  the  temper  and  anxiety  of  England,  and  such  the  can- 
dor and  good  sense  of  our  ministers,  that  an  honourable  and  advan' 
tageous  arrangement  did  take  filace.  The  authority  of  Mr.  Monroe, 
then  Minister  at  the  court  of  Great  Britain,  now  Secretary  of  State, 
and  one  of  the  present  administration,  who  have  recommended  Mrar 
with  England,  and  assigned  impressments  as  a  cause,  supports  the 
undersigned  in  asserting,  that  it  was  honourable  and  advantageous  : 
for  in  a  letter  from  Richmond  dated  the  38th  of  February  1 308,  to 
Mr.  Madison,  the  following  expressions  are  used  by  Mr.  Monroe. — 
"  I  have  on  the  contrary  always  believed' and  still  do  believe  that  the 
"  ground  on  which  that  interest  (impressment)  was  placed  by  the 
"  paper  of  the  British  Commissioners  of  8th  November  1 806,  and 
"  the  explanation  which  accompanied  it,  was  both  honourable  and  ad- 
"  vantageoua  to  the  United  States,  that  it  contained  a  concession  in 
"  their  favor  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  on  the  great  principle  in 
"  contestation,  never  before  made  by  a  formal  and  obligatory  act  of 
"  their  government,  which  was  highly  favourable  to  their  interest." 

With  the  opinion  of  Mr.  King  so  decidedly  expressed,  with  the 
official  admission  of  Mr.  Madison,  with  the  explicit  declaration  of 
Mr.  Monroe,  all  concurring  that  Great  Britain  was  ready  to  aban- 
don impressment  on  the  high  seas,  and  with  an  honourable  and  ad- 
vantageous arrangement,  actually  made  by  Mr.  Monroe,  how  can  it 
be  pretended,  that  all  hope  of  settlement,  by  treaty^  has  failed  i  how 
can  this  subject  furnish  a  proper  cause  of  war  ? 

With  rcapect  to  the  subject  of  blockades,  the  principle  of  the 
law  of  nations,  as  asserted  by  the  United  States,  is,  that  a  blockade 
can  only  be  justified  when  supported  by  an  adequate  force.  In  the- 
ory this  principle  is  admitted  by  Great  Britain.  It  is  alleged,  how- 
ever, that  in  practice  she  disregards  that  principle. 

The  order  of  blockade,  whirh  has  been  made  a  specific  ground  of 
complaint  by  France,  is  that  of  the  1 6th  of  May,  1 806.  Yet,  strange 
as  it  may  seem,  this  order,  Avhich  is  now  made  one  ground  of  wai 


I 


_j 


n 


—that 

erview 
stated 
id  con- 
oncur- 
thc  rc- 
rnment 
lich  no 
igcncy 
itain,  to 
Amer- 
is,  if  "A- 
theU- 
ects.— 
Viessrs. 
,1806. 
e  part  of 
Such, 
the  can- 
i advan- 
Monroe, 
of  State, 
ided  \frar 
ports  the 
:agcous  : 
1308,  to 
Lonroe. — 
;  that  the 
d  by  the 
806,  and 
'e  and  ad- 
;ession  in 
nciole  in 
>ry  act  of 
merest." 
with  the 
iration  of 
to  aban- 
e  and  ad- 
low  can  it 
led  ?  how 

le  of  the 

bloekade 

In  the- 

ged,  hovv- 

jjround  of 
:t,  strange 
id  of  wai 


between  the  two  countries,  was,  at  the  time  ot  iib  iirst  issuing*  view- 
ed as  an  act  of  favor  and  conciliation.  On  tl  a  subject  it  is  necessa- 
ry  to  be  explicit.  The  vague  and  indeterminate  manner  in  vhich 
the  Ameriean  and  French  governments,  in  their  official  papers,  speak 
of  this  order  of  blockade,  is  calculated  to  mislead.  An  importance 
is  attached  to  it,  of  which,  in  the  opinion  of  the  undersigned,  it  is  not 
worthy.    Let  the  facts  speak  for  themselves. 

In  August,  1804,  the  British  established  a  blockade  at  the  entrance 
of  the  French  ports,  naming  them,  from  Fecamp  to  Ostend ;  and 
from  their  proximity  to  the  British  coasts,  and  the  absence  of  all 
complaint,  v^e  tnay  be  permitted  to  believe  that  it  was  a  legal  block- 
ade, enfurced  according  to  the  usages  of  nations.  On  the  16th  of 
May,  1806,  the  English  Secretary  of  Slate,  Mr.  Fox,  notified  to  our 
Minister  at  London,  that  his  government  had  thought  fit  to  direct 
necessary  measures  to  b«  taken  for  the  blockade  of  the  coasts,  rivers 
and  ports,  from  the  river  Elbe  to  the  river  Brest,  both  inclusive.* 

In  point  of  fact,  as  the  terms  used  in  the  order  will  show,  this 
paper,  which  has  become  a  substantive  and  avowed  cause  for  non* 
intercourse,  embargo  and  war,  is  a  blockade  only  of  the  places,  on 
the  French  coast,  from  Ostend  to  the  Seine,  and  even  as  to  these  it 
is  merely  as  it  professes  to  be,  a  continuance  of  a  Conner  and  ex- 
isting blockade.  For  with  respect  to  the  residue  cf  the  coast,  trade 
of  neutrals  is  admitted,  with  the  exception  only  of  enemy's  property 
and  articles  contraband  of  war,  which  are  liable  to  be  taken  without 
a  blockade ;  and  except  the  direct  colonial  trade  of  the  enemy,  which 
Great  Britain  denied  to  be  free  by  the  law  of  nations.  Why  the 
order  was  thus  extended,  in  its  form,  while  in  effect  it  added  nothing 
to  orders  and  regulations  already  existing,  will  be  known  by  advert- 
ing to  papers,  which  are  before  the  world.  In  1806,  France  had  yet 
colonies,  and  the  wound  inflicted  on  our  feelings,  by  the  interference 
of  the  British  government  in  our  trade  with  those  colonies,  had  been 
the  cau^e  of  remonstrance  and  negotiation.  At  the  moment  when 
the  order  of  May  1806  was  made,  Mr.  Monroe,  th&  present  Secreta- 
ry of  State,  then  our  minister  plenipotentiary  at  the  Court  of  Great 
Britain,  was  in  treaty  on  the  subject  of  the  cariying  trade,  and  judg- 
ing on  the  spot,  and  at  the  time,  he,  unhesitatingly,  gave  his  opinion, 
that  the  order  was  made  to  favor  American  views  and  interests. 
This  idea  h  unequivocally  expressed,  in  Mr.  Monroe's  letters  to 
Mr.  Madison  of  the  17th,  and  aothf  of  May,  and  of  the  9th  of  June," 
1806. 

•  The  terms  of  the  order  are  these,  '•  That  the  said  coast,  rivers  and  ports  must  be 
"  Gonsidereil  as  blockaded,"  but,  "  thKt  such  blockade  sljall  not  extend  to  prevent  neu- 
"  U'al  sliipa  and  vessels,  lailcn  with  goods,  not  being  the  pro|)crty  of  his  majesty's  ene< 
"  mies,  and  not  being  contraband  of  war,  from  approaching  the  said  coasts  and  enterini; 
<*  into  and  sailing  from  tjie  said  rivers  and  ports,  suve  and  except  the  coast,  rivers  an(l 
*'  ports  from  Ostend  to  tlie  river  Seine,  already  in  a  state  of  strict  and  rigorous  blockade ; 
"  and  w'lich  are  to  be  considered  as  ao  continued,"  witii  a  r  viso  that  the  vessels  "  enter- 
"  ing  had  not  been  laden  at  a  port  belonging  to,  or  in  possesiion  of,  the  enemies  of  Great 
"  Britaift,  and  the  vessclsdeparting  were  not  desthied  loan  enemy's  port,  or  had  previous- 
>»  ly  broken  WoekadL." 


A 


t  The  following  are  extracts  from  the^c  Utters.    In  that  of  the  17th  May,  1806,  he 
thus  speaks  of  that  blocksHe.    Itis  ".o'-g'trel  in  frm*  v't'  lestraiiititn'l  pi'uffnes  toesteod 


I- 


•/ 


w 


12 


U 


And  as  late  as  October,  1811,  the  same  Gentleman,  writing «as 
Secretary  of  State  to  the  British  minister,  speaking  of  the  same  or- 
der of  blockade  of  May,  1806,  says,  "  it  strictly  was  little  more  than 
"a  blockade  of  the  coast  from  Seine  to  Ostend."  «  The  object  was 
"  to  afford  to  the  United  States  an  accommodation  respecting  the 
«  colonial  trade." 

I*  appears,  then,  that  this  order  was,  in  point  of  fact,  made  to  fa- 
vour our  trade,  and  was  so  understood  and  admitted  by  the  govern- 
ment of  this  country,  at  that  tiine  and  since ;  that,  instead  of  extend- 
ing prior  blockades,  it  lessened  them  ;  that  the  country  from  Seine 
to  Brest,  and  from  Ostend  to  Elbe  was  inserted  to  open  them  to  our 
colonial  trade  and  for  our  accommodation,  and  that  it  was  never 
made  the  subject  of  complaint,  by  the  American  government,  during 
its  practical  continuance,  that  is,  not  until  the  first  order  in  council; 
and  indeed  not  until  after  the  Ist  of  May,  1810;  and  until  after  the 
American  government  was  apprized  of  the  ground,  which  it  was  the 
will  of  France  should  be  taken  upon  the  subject. 

Of  this  we  have  the  most  decisive  proof  in  the  offers  made  under 
the  administration  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  for  the  discontinuance  of  the 
Embargo  as  it  related  to  Great  Britain  ;  none  of  which  required  the 
repeal  of  the  blockade  of  May  1806  ;  and  also  in  the  arrangement 
made  during  the  administration  of  Mr.  Madison,  and  under  his  eye 
with  Mr.  Erskine.  The  non-intercourse  act  of  March  1809,  and 
the  act "  concerning  commercial  intercourse"  of  May  1810,  vest  the 
President  of  the  United  States  with  the  very  same  power,  in  the 
very  same  terms.  Both  authorise  him  "  in  case  either  Great  Brit- 
*»  ain  or  France  shall  so  revoke  or  modify  her  edicts,  as  that  they 
"  shall  cease  to  violate  the  neutral  commerce  of  the  United  States," 
to  declare  the  same  by  proclamation.  And  by  the  provisions  of  one 
law  in  such  case,  non-intercourse  was  to  cease  ;  by  those  of  the  oth- 
er it  was  to  be  re\ived.  In  consequence  of  power  vested  by  the 
first  act,  the  arrangement  with  Erskine  was  made,  and  the  revocation 
of  the  orders  in  council  of  January  and  November  1 807  was  con- 
sidered as  a  full  compliance  with  the  law,  and  as  removing  all  the 
anti-neutral  edicts.  The  blockade  of  May  1 806  was  not  included  in 
the  "Tangement  and  it  does  not  appeer,  that  it  was  deemed  of 
sufficient  importance  to  engage  even  a  thought.  Yet  under  the  act 
of  May,  1810,  which  vests  the  very  same  power,  a  revocation  of  this 
blockade  of  May,  1806,  is  made  by  our  cabinet  a  iine  qua  non  ;  an 
indispensible  requisite  I    And  now,  after  the  British  minister  has 


1         I 


>  J'« 


"  the  blockade  further  than  was  heretofore  rfone,  nevertheless  it  takes  it  from  many 
"  ports,  alreadi/  blockaded  inilccil,  ft-om  all  East  of  Osteiul,  and  West  of  the  Seine,  ex- 
"  cept  In  articJcs  contraband  of  war  and  enemies  pr»niertj-,  which  are  seizable  without. 
••  blockade.  And  in  like  for:n  of  exception,  cmisidenng  every  enemy  as  one  power,  it 
"  admits  the  trade  of  neutrals,  within  the  same  limits,  I"  he  free  in  the  productions  of 
"  enemies  colonics,  in  every  but  the  direct  route  between  the  colony  and  the  parent 
"  country."  Mr.  Monroe  adds,  "  It  cannot  be  doulitetl  thai  the  note  was  drawn  by  the 
"  government,  in  reference  to  the  question,  and  if  intended  ns  the  foundntion  of  a  treaty 
''  must  be  viewed  in  a  favorable  light."  On  the  2f)th  of  May,  Mr.  Monroe  writes  to 
Mr.  Madison,  that  he  h:id  been  "strcr<!;lhen<?d  in  the  opinion,  that  llio  order  of  the  lOlh 
••  was  drawn  with  a  view  to  the  question  of  our  trade  with  eneniies  colonics,  and  that  \\ 
"  promises  to  be  highly  satisfactory  to  our  commercial  inltTcsis." 


13 

fUrectly  avowed  that  this  order  of  blockade  would  not  coiYtinuc 
after  a  revocation  of  the  orders  in  council,  without  a  due  application 
of  an  adequate  force,  the  existence  of  this  blockade  is  insisted  up- 
on as  a  justifiable  cause  of  war,  notwithstanding  that  our  govern- 
ment admits  a  blockade  is  legal,  to  the  maintenance  of  which  an  ad* 
equate  force  is  applied. 

The  undersigned  are  aware,  that,  in  justification  of  this  new  ground) 
it  is  now  said  that  the  extension  on  paper,  for  whatever  purpose  in* 
tended,  favors  the  principle  of  paper  blockades.  This  however  can 
hardly  be  urged,  since  the  British*  formally  disavow  the  principle ; 
and  since  they  acknowledge  the  very  doctrine  of  the  law  of  nations, 
for  which  the  American  administration  contend,  henceforth  the  ex- 
istence of  a  blockade  becomes  a  question  of  fact :  it  must  depend 
upon  the  evidence  adduced  in  support  of  the  adequacy  of  the  block- 
ading force. 

From  the  preceding  statement  it  is  apparent  that,  whatever  there 
is  objectionable  in  the  principle  of  the  order  of  May  1 806,  or 
hi  the  practice  under  it,  on  ground  merely  American,  it  cannot 
be  set  up  as  a  sufficient  cause  of  war  ;  for  until  France  pointed  it 
out  as  a  cause  of  controversy,  it  was  so  far  from  being  regarded,  as 
a  source  of  any  new  or  grievous  complaint,  that  it  was  actually  con- 
sidered, by  our  government,  in  a  favorable  light. 

The  British  Orders  in  Council  are  the  remaining  source  of  dis- 
content) and  avowed  cause  of  war.  These  have,  heretofore,  been 
considered  by  our  government  in  connexion  with  the  French  de- 
crees. Cer*  ainly,  the  British  Orders  in  Council  and  French  decrees 
form  a  system  subversive  of  neutral  rights,  and  constitute  just 
grounds  of  complaint ;  yet,  viewed  relatively  to  the  condition  of  those 
powers  towards  each  other,  and  of  the  United  States  towards  both, 
the  undersigned  cannot  persuade  themselves  that  the  Orders  in 
CouncU,  as  they  now  exist,  and  with  their  present  effect  and  operation, 
justify  the  selection  of  Great  Britain  as  our  enemy,  and  render  ne- 
cessary a  declaration  of  unqualified  war. 

Every  consideration  of  moral  duty  and  political  expedienc(i 
seems  to  concur  in  warning  the  United  States,  not  to  mingle  in  this 
hopeless,  and,  to  human  eye,  interminable  European  contest.  Nei- 
ther France,  nor  England,  pretends  that  their  aggressions  can  be 
defended,  on  the  ground  of  any  other  belligerent  right)  than  that  of 
particular  necessity. 

Both  attempt  to  justify  their  encroachments  on  the  general  law  of 
nations  by  the  plea  of  retaliation.     In  the  ralative  position  and  pro- 


*  Mr.  Foster  in  his  tetter  of  the  Sd  July  1811  to  Mr.  Monroe  thus  states  the  doctrine 
tnaintained  by  his  government. 

"  Great  Britain  has  tievei'  attempted  to  dispute  that,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  the  law 
"  of  nations,  no  blockade  can  be  justifiable  or  valid,  unless  it  be  supported  by  an  ade- 
"  quate  force  destined  to  maintain  it  and  to  expose  to  hazard  all  vessels  attempting  to  e- 
"  vade  its  operation. 

"  Mr.  Foster  in  bis  letter  to  Mr.  Monroe  of  the  S6th  July,  1 8t  I ,  also  says,  "The  bloc1(- 
"  ade  of  May  1K06,  will  not  continue  after  the  repeal  of  the  orders  in  council,  unless  his 
'•  Majesty's  government  shall  think  fit  to  sustain  it  by  the  special  application  of  a  stifli- 
"  cient  naval  foi-ce,  and  the  fart  of  its  beinp  so  continuei),  or  not,  will  be  notified  at  the 
"  time." 


'if'T^ 


•;,     .1  iiM 


14 

porilon  of  strength  of  the  Utiitcd  States  to  either  belli(;ei-ent,  there 
appeared  little  probability,  that  we  could  compel  the  one  or  the 
other,  by  hostile  operations,  to  abandon  this  plea. 

And  as  the  field  of  comntercial  entcrprize,  after  allowing  to  the 
decrees  and  orders  their  full  practical  effect,  is  still  rich  and  exten- 
sive, there  seemed  as  little  wisdom  as  obligation  to  yield  solid  and 
certain  realities  for  unattainable  pretensions.  The  right  of  retalia- 
tion, a9  existing  in  cither  belligerent,  it  was  impossible  for  the 
United  States,  consistent  with  either  their  duty  or  interest,  to  admit. 
Yet  such  was  the  state  of  the  decrees  and  orders  of  the  respective 
belligerents,  in  relation  to  the  rights  of  neutrals,  that,  while  on  the 
one  hand,  it  formed  iio  justification  to  either,  so  on  the  other,  con- 
current circumstances  formed  a  complete  justification  to  the  United 
States  in  maintaining,  notwithstanding  these  encroacliments,  pro- 
vided it  best  comported  with  their  interests,  that  system  of  impartial 
neutrality,  wliicii  is  so  desirable  to  their  peace  and  prosperity.  For 
if  it  should  be  admitted,  which  no  course  of  argument  can  maintain, 
that  the  Berlin  decree,  which  was  issued  on  the  21st  of  November 
1806,  was  justified  by  the  antecedent  orders  of  the  British  admiral- 
ty, respecting  the  colonial  trade,  and  by  the  order  of  block&de  of  the 
16th  of  May  preceding,  yet  on  this  account  there  resulted  no  right 
of  retaliation  to  France,  as  it  respected  the  United  States.  They  had 
expressed  no  acquiescence  either  in  the  British  interference  with 
the  colonial  trade,  or  in  any  extension  of  the  principles  of  blockade. 
Besides,  had  there  been  any  such  neglect  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States,  as  warranted  the  French  emperor  in  adopting  his  principle 
of  retaliation,  yet  in  the  exercise  of  that  pretended  right  he  passed 
the  bounds  of  both  public  law  and  decency  ;  and  in  the  very  extrav- 
agance of  that  exercise,  lost  the  advantage  of  whatever  colour  the  Bri- 
tish had  afforded  to  his  pretences.  Not  content  with  adopting  a  princi- 
ple of  retaliation,  in  terms  limited  and  appropriate  to  the  injury  of 
which  he  complained,  he  declared  <'  all  the  British  Islands  in  a  state 
*t  of  blockade  ;  prohibited  all  commerce  and  correspondence  with 
** them,  all  trade  in  their  manufactures;  and  made  lawful  prize  of 
"  all  merchandize,  belonging  to  England,  or  copiing  from  its  man- 
*'  ufitctqries  and  colonies." 

The  violence  of  these  encroachments  was  equalled  only  by  the 
insidiousness  qf  the  terms  and  manner,  in  which  they  were  pro- 
mulgated. The  scope  of  the  expressions  of  the  Berlin  decree 
was  so  general,  that  it  embraced  within  its  sphere  the  whole  com- 
merce of  neutrals  with  England.  Yet  Decres,  Minister  of  the 
Marine  of  France,  by  a  formal  note  of  the  24th  December,  1806, 
assured  our  minister  Plenipotentiary,  that  the  imperial  decree  of 
the  21st  November,  1806,  "  wa«  not  to  affect  our  commerce^  which 
*^  would  still  be  governed  by  the  rulet  of  the  treaty  established 
"  between  the  two  countries."  Notwithstanding  this  assurance  how- 
ever, on  the  18th  September  following,  Regnier,  grand  minister  of 
justice,  declared  "  that  the  intentions  of  the  Emfieror  were  that,  by 
•'  virtue  of  that  decree f  French  armed  vessels  might  seize  in  neutral 
*'  vcsseisy  either  English  /iro/ierty^  or  merchandize  /iroceeding  from 
'';'/i''  Erg'luJi  mfitutfact'orie." ;  aiid  ('laT  he  had  reserved  for  future 


%■ 


i. 


15 


"  lieciaion,  the  quettion  whether  they  might  not  fioascsa  themselves 
^*  0/ neutral  vetaels  going  to  or  from  England^  although  theij  had 
«  no  English  manufacturea  or  board"  pretensions  so  obviously 
exceeding  any  measure  of  retaliation,  that,  if  the  precedent  acts 
of  the  British  government  hud  afforded  to  such  a  resort  any  col- 
our of  right,  it  was  lost  in  the  violence  and  extravagance  Af  these 
assumed  principles. 

To  the  Berlin  decree  succeeded  the  British  orders  in  council 
of  the  7th  of  January  1807,  which  were  merged  in  the  orders  of 
the  lUh  of  November  following.  These  declared  "all  ports 
and  places  belonging  to  France  and  its  allies,  from  which  the 
British  flag  was  excluded,  all  in  the  colonics  of  his  Britannic  ma- 
jesty's enemies,  in  a  state  of  blockade  ;  prohibiting  all  trade  in 
the  produce  and  manufactures  of  the  said  countries  or  colonies ; 
and  making  all  vessels  trading  to  or  from  tlicm  and  all  nicrchan- 
dise  on  board  subject  to  capture  and  condemnation,  with  an  ex- 
ception only  in  favour  of  the  direct  trade  between  neutral  coua« 
trien  and  the  colonies  of  his  majesty's  enemies." 

These  extravagant  pretensions  on  the  part  of  Gre«t-Britain 
were  immediately  succeeded  by  others  still  niore  extravagant  on 
the  part  of  France.  Without  waiting  for  auy  knowledge  of  the 
course  the  American  government  would  take,  in  reJation  to  the 
British  orders  in  council,  the  French  Emperor  issued,  on  the  17th 
of  December  following,  his  Milan  decree,  by  which  "  every  ship,  of 
"whatever  nation,  which  shall  have  submitted  to  search  by  an 
"  English  ship,  or  to  a  voyage  to  England,  or  paid  any  tax  to  thui 
"  government,  are  declared  denationalized  and  lawful  prize. 

"  The  British  Islands  are  declared  in  a  state  of  blockade,  by  sea 
"and  land,  and  every  ship,  of  whatever  nation,  or  whatsoever  the 
"  nature  of  its  cargo  may  >e,  that  sails  from  England,  or  those  of  the 
"  English  colonies,  or  of  countries  occupied  by  English  troops, 
"  and  proceeding  to  England,  or  to  the  English  colonies,  or  to 
"  countries  occupied  by  the  English,  to  be  good  prize."  The  na- 
ture and  extent  of  these  injuries,  thus  accumulated  by  mutual  ef- 
forts of  both  belligerents,  seemed  to  teach  the  American  statesmen 
this  important  lesson-^not  to  attach  the  cause  of  his  country  to 
one  or  the  other  ;  but  by  systematic  and  solid  provisions,  for  sea- 
coast  and  maritime  defence,  to  place  its  interests,  as  far  as  its  sit- 
uation and  resources  permit,  beyond  the  reach  of  the  rapacity,  or 
ambition  of  any  European  power.  Happy  would  it  have  been  for 
our  country,  if  a  course  of  policy  so  simple  and  obvious  had  been 
adopted  ! 

Unfortunately  our  administration  had  recourse  to  a  system,  com- 
plicated in  its  nature,  and  destructive  in  its  effects  ;  which,  instead 
of  relief  from  the  accumulated  injuries  of  foreign  governments, 
served  only  to  fill  up  what  was  wanting  in  the  measure  of  evils 
abroad  by  artificial  embarrassments  at  home.  As  lont;  a2;o  as  the 
year  1794,  Mr.  Madison,  the  present  President  of  tlic  Unitcii 
States,  then  a  member  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  devised 
and  proposed  a  system  of  commercial  restrictions,  which  had  w: 
\\<\  object  the  coiTcion  of  Great-liritJiin,  bv  a  d*  .u.'t  to  h-*.',  orvuv 


.1.' 


I  '^h 


[iyir*A.^^:J 


(r 


16 


i  li  i' 


■II 


;^.  ^ 


products  and  our  market ;  asserting  that  the  former  was,  in  a 
manner,  essential  to  her  prosperity,  either  as  necessaries  of  life,  or 
as  raw  materials  for  her  manufactures  ;  and  that,  without  the  lat- 
ter, a  great  proportion  of  her  labouring  classes  could  not  subsist. 

In  that  day  of  sage  and  virtuous  forethought  the  proposition  was 
rejected.  It  remamed,  however,  a  theme  of  unceasing  panegyric 
among  an  active  class  of  American  politicians,  who  with  a  system- 
atic pertinacity  inculcated  among  the  people,  that  commercial  re- 
strictions were  a  species  of  warfare,  which  would  ensure  success 
to  the  United  States  and  humiliation  to  Great  Britain. 

There  were  two  circumstances  inherent  in  this  system  of  coer- 
cing Great  Britain  by  commercial  restrictions,  which  ought  to 
have  made  practical  politicians  very  doubtful  of  its  result,  and 
very  cautious  of  its  trial.  These  were  the  state  of  opinion  in  re- 
lation to  its  efficacy  among  commercial  men  in  the  United  States  ; 
and  the  state  of  feeling,  which  a  resort  to  it  would  unavoidably 
produce,  in  Great  Britain.  On  the  one  hand,  it  was  undeniable 
that  the  great  body  of  commercial  men  in  the  United  States  had 
no  belief  in  such  a  dependence  of  Great  Britain,  upon  the  United 
States,  either  for  our  produce,  or  our  market,  as  the  system  im- 
plied. 

Without  the  hearty  co-operation  of  this  class  of  men,  success  in 
its  attempt  was  obviously  unattainable.  And  as  on  them  the  chief 
suffering  would  fall,  it  was  altogether  unreasonable  to  expect  that 
they  would  become  instruments  co-operating  in  support  of  any  syS" 
tem,  which  was  ruin  to  them,  and  without  hope  to  their  country. 
On  the  other  hand;  as  it  respects  Great  Britain,  a  system,  pro- 
ceeding upon  the  avgjwed  principle  of  her  dependence  upon  us,  was 
among  the  last  to  which  a  proud  and  powerful  nation  would  yield. 

Notwithstanding  these  obvious  considerations,  in  April,  1806, 
Mr.  Madison  being  then  Secretary  of  State,  a  law  passed  Con- 
gress, prohibiting  the  importation  of  certain  specified  manufac- 
tures of  Great  Britain  and  her  dependencies,  on  the  basis  of  Mr. 
Madison's  original  proposition.  Thus  the  United  States  entered 
on  the  system  of  commercial  hostility  against  Great  Britain. 

The  decree  of  Berlin  was  issued  in  the  ensuing  November, 
(1806.)  The  treaty,  which  had  been  signed  at  London,  in  Decem- 
ber, 1806,  having  been  rejected  by  Mr.  Jefferson,  without  being 
presented  to  the  Senate  for  ratification,  and  the  non-importation 
act  not  being  repealed,  but  only  suspended.  Great  Britain  issued 
her  orders  in  council,  on  the  11th  November,  1807. 

On  the  2 1st  of  the  same  month  of  Nov.  Champagny,  French 
minister  of  foreign  affairs,  wrote  to  Mr.  Armstrong,  the  American 
minister,  in  the  words  following.  "  All  the  difficulties,  which 
•*  have  given  rise  to  your  reclamations,  Sir,  would  be  removed 
"  with  ease,  if  the  government  of  th'.  United  States,  after  com- 
"  plaining  in  vain  of  the  injustice  and  violations  of  England,  took, 
"  with  the  whole  continent,  the  part  of  guaranteeing  it  therefrom." 

On  the  17th  of  the  ensuing  December,  the  Milan   decree    wa^ 


"  go  Mil 

"  and 
«  the 
"  piizd 
"  or  oii 


m  f 


■«uwjiiiii>mj    ^ 


17 

issued  on  the  part  of  France,  and  five  days  afterwards  tlio  em- 
bargo was  passed  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.  Tims  was 
completed,  l)y  acts  nearly  cotcniporancous,  the  circle  of  commer- 
cial hostilities. 

After  an  incfTectual  trial  of  four  years  to  control  the  policy  of 
ine  two  belligerents  by  this  system,  it  was  cii  the  part  of  the  U- 
nited  States,  for  a  *'  ne,  relinquished.  The  act  of  the  1st  of  May, 
1810,  gave  the  authority,  however,  to  the  President  of  the  United 
States  to  revive  it  against  Great  Britain,  in  case  France  revoked 
her  decrees.  Such  revocation  on  the  part  of  France  was  declared 
by  the  President's  proclamation  on  the  2d  November,  1810  ;  and 
in  consequence  non-intercourse  was  revived  by  our  administration 
against  Great  Britain. 

At  all  times  the  undersigned  have  looked  with  much  anxiety 
for  the  evidence  of  this  revocation.  They  wished  not  to  c)4icstion, 
what,  in  various  forms,  has  been  so  often  asserted  by  the  adminis- 
tration and  its  agents,  by  their  directions.  But  neither  as  public 
men,  nor  as  citizens,  can  they  consent  that  the  peace  and  pros- 
perity of  the  country  should  be  sacrificed,  in  maintenance  of  a  po- 
sition, which  on  no  principle  of  evidence  they  deem  tenable. 
They  cannot  falsify,  or  conceal  their  conviction,  that  the  French 
ilecrees  neither  have  been,  nor  arc  revoked. 

Without  pretending  to  occupy  the  whole  field  of  argument 
which  the  question  of  revocation  has  opened,  a  concise  statement 
seems  inseparable  from  the  occasion. 

The  condition  on  which  the  non-intercourse,  according  to  the 
act  of  1st  May,  1810,  might  be  revived  against  Great  Britain,  was, 
on  the  part  of  France,  an  rff'i'ctxial  revocation  of  her  decrees. 
What  the  President  of  the  United  States  was  bound  to  require 
from  the  French  government  was,  the  evidence  of  such  effectual 
revocation.  Upon  this  point  both  the  right  of  the  United  States 
and  the  duty  of  the  President  seem  to  be  resolvable  into  very- 
distinct  and  undeniable  principles.  The  object  to  be  obtained 
for  the  United  States  from  France  was  an  effectual  revocation  of 
the  decrees.  A  revocation  to  be  effectual  must  include,  in  the 
nature  of  things,  this  essential  requisite  : — the  wrongs  done  to 
the  neutral  commerce  of  the  United  States,  by  the  operarion  of 
the  decrees,  must  be  stopped.  Nothing  short  of  this  could  be  an 
effectual  revocation. 

Without  reference  to  the  other  w  rongs  resulting  from  those 
decrees  to  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  ;  it  will  be  suffir 
cient  to  state  the  prominent  wrong  done  by  the  3d.  article*  of  the 

•  This  article  is  in  tlicse  words  : 

"  Jirt.  III.  I'he  Britisli  islaiula  arc  declared  to  be  in  a  state  of  blockade,  both  by 
"  laiul  and  sea.  Kvcry  ship  of  -whatever  nation,  or  wlmtsoever  tiie  ii.iture  of  its  eui-- 
"  go  may  be,  that  sails  from  the  ports  of  England,  or  tliose  of  t!»e  Enp;!isli  colonii-i 
••  "  and  of  the  countries  occupied  by  Knglish  troops  and  \)rc)ccediiipt<)  Kii<;luiid,  oi-  ti» 
"  the  English  colonics,  or  to  countries  occupied  by  English  troops,  is  good  ar.d  hiw  ful 
•'  prize,  as  contrary  to  the  present  decree,  amJ  may  ba  cujituved  lit/  our  ^Lipi  u/mir, 
"  or  ow  privateers,  and  adjiidged  to  the  captor," 


,\ 


;/ 


r 


wwpi 


H 


I 


h 


Milan  decree.  The  nature  of  this  wront^  essentially  consisted  iu 
f/ir  authority  f^ivrn  lo  l-'rcnch  sbips  of  war  and  privateers  to  muke 
prize  at  scu  of  cvcM'y  neutral  vessel,  sailini;  to  or  from  any  of 
the  Eiiglisli  possessions.  The  aiitliority  to  capture  was  the  very 
essence  of  the  wrong.  It  follows  tijcrcforc,  that  (in  ijf'ectual  rcvo- 
ration  rrquiicci  Ihnt  the  authority  to  cafilurr  nhould  he  annulled. 
Granting  therefore,  for  the  sake  of  argument,  (what  from  its  terms 
and  its  nature  was  certainly  not  the  case)  that  the  noted  letter  of 
the  Duke  of  Cadore  of  the  5th  of  August  1810  held  forth  a  revo- 
cation, good  in  point  of  form,  and  unconditional,  yet  it  wan  not 
that  effectual  revocc,  n  for  which  the  act  of  1st  May  1810  alone 
authorised  the  Prcsiv.ont  of  the  United  States  to  issue  his  procla- 
mation, unless  in  consec/urnce  of  that  letter  the  authority  to  ca/i- 
ture  ivas  unuullcd.  The  letter  itself  is  no  annulment  of  the  au- 
thority to  capture,  and  it  is  notorious  that  no  evidence  of  the  an- 
nulment of  this  authority  to  capture  ever  has  been  adduced.  It 
has  not  even  been  pretended;  On  the  contrary  there  is  deci- 
sive and  almost  daily  evidence  of  the  continued  existence  of  this 
authority  to  capture. 

The  charge  of  executing  the  decrees  of  Dcrlin  and  Milan  was, 
80  far  as  concerned  his  department,  given  by  the  terms  of  thoqc 
decrees  to  the  French  minister  of  Marine.  According  to  estab- 
lished principles  of  general  law,  the  imperial  act  which  gave  the 
authority  must  be  annulled  by  another  imperial  act,  equally  for- 
mal and  solemn  ;  or  at  least  the  authority  to  capture  must  be  coun- 
termanded by  some  order  or  instruction  from  the  minister  of 
marine.  Nothing  short  of  this  could  annul  the  authority  accord- 
ing to  the  rule  of  the  sea  service.  Was  such  annulling  act  ever 
issued  by  the  French  Emperor  ?  Were  any  such  countermand- 
ing orders  or  instructions  ever  given  by  the  French  minister  of 
marine  ?  In  exercis'ng  a  trust,  committed  to  him  by  the  legisla- 
ture, on  a  point  so  interesting  to  the  neutral  commerce  of  the 
United  States,  and  so  important  to  the  peace  of  the  nation,  was  it 
not  the  duty  of  the  President  to  have  the  evidence  of  such  annul- 
ment, before  the  issuing  of  any  proclamation  ?  Has  he  ever  insist- 
ed upon  such  evidence  ?  Was  it  of  no  consequence  in  the  relative 
situation  of  this  country  as  to  foreign  powers,  that  the  regular 
evidence  should  be  received  by  our  administration,  and  made 
known  ?  Why  has  a  matter  of  evidence,  so  obviously  proper,  so 
simple  in  its  nature,  so  level  to  general  apprehension,  and  so  im- 
periously deniaiuled  by  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  been  whol- 
ly omitted  ?  And  why,  if  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  are  annul- 
led,  as  is  pretended,  does  the  French  emperor  withhold  this  evi- 
dence of  their  annulment  ?  Why  does  he  withhold  it,  when  the 
question  of  revocation  is  presented  under  circumstances  of  so 
much  urgency  i 

Not  only  has  it  never  been  pretended  that  any  such  imperial 
act  of  annulment  has  issued,  or  that  any  such  orders  or  instruc- 
tions, countermanding  the  authority  to  capture,  were  ever  giveii} 


Rv 

sa^ 


yei 
ins 


ifi 


stetl  J« 
1  make 
any  of 
le  very 
:il  rcvo- 
nnulltd, 
s  terms 
cttcr  of 

a  rcvo- 
wan  not 
10  uloue 

procla- 

10  call' 
f  the  au- 

the  an- 
ced.      It 
is   deci- 
e  of  this 

ilan  was, 
of  tho^c 
to  estab- 
gave  the 
ually   for- 
t  be  coun- 
linistcr  of 
ty  accord- 
g  act  ever 
intcrmand- 
iiiinistcr  of 
he  legisla- 
rce  of  the 
Lion,  was  it 
iuch  annul- 
■ver  insist- 
Lhe  relative 
he   regular 
,  and  made 
r  proper,  so 
and  so  im- 
been  whol- 
s  are  annul* 
)ld  this  evi- 
t,  when  the 
tances  of  so 

jch  imperial 

or   instruc- 

!  ever  given, 


but  there  is  decisive  evidence  of  the  reverse  in  the  conduct  nl'  the 
FrcJich  public  armi'd  sliips  and  privateers.  At  all  tiincs  «.ince 
Nov.  1810,  these  ships  uiid  privateers  have  continued  lo  capture 
our  vessels  and  prf)perty,  on  the  hii^h  seas,  upon  tlu;  piinciples  of 
the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees.  A  numerous  list  of  AnuricvUi  ves- 
sels, thus  taken  since  the  1st  of  Nov.  1810,  now  exists  in  the  of- 
fice of  the  secretary  of  state  :  and  among  the  captures  arc  several 
vessels  with  their  cargoes  lately  tal.en  and  destroyed  at  sea, 
witliout  the  formality  of  u  trial,  by  the  commander  of  a  Trench 
squadron,  ut  this  montent  cruizing  against  our  coinnu  rco,  under 
orders  given  by  the  minister  of  marine,  to  whom  the  execution 
of  the  decrees  was  committed  ;  and  these  too  issued  in  Jatmary 
last.  In  the  Baltic  and  Mediterranean  seas,  captures  by  l-'reacU 
privateers  arc  known  to  us  by  otVicial  documents  to  have  been 
made,  under  the  authority  of  these  decr«;es.  How  then  arc  they 
revoked  i  How  have  they  eeased  to  violate  our  neutral  commerce  ? 
Had  any  repeal  or  modification  of  those  decrees  in  truth  ti\ken 
place,  it  must  have  been  communicated  to  the  prize  courts,  and 
would  have  been  evidenced  by  some  variation  either  in  their  ru'.js, 
or  in  the  principles  of  their  decisions.  In  vain,  however,  will 
this  nation  seek  for  such  proof  of  the  revocation  of  the  decrees. 
No  acquittal  has  ever  been  had  in  any  of  the  prize  courts,  upon 
the  ground  that  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  had  ceased,  even  as 
it  respects  the  United  States.  On  the  contrary  the  evidence  is 
decisive  that  they  are  considered  by  the  French  courts  as  exist- 
ing. 

There  arc  many  cases  corroborative  of  this  position.  It  is  c- 
nough  to  state  only  two,  which  appear  in  the  official  reports. 
The  American  ship  Julian  was  captured  by  a  French  privateer 
on  the  4th  of  July,  181 1,  and  on  the  loth  of  September,  1811,  the 
vessel  and  cargo  were  condemned  by  the  council  of  prizes  i>t 
Paris,  among  other  reasons,  because  a/te  was  visited  by  nex<erat 
Kngliah  vessels.  On  the  same  day  the  Hercules,  an  American 
ship,  was  condemned  by  the  imperial  court  of  prizes,  alleging 
"  that  it  was  impossible  that  she  was  not  visited  by  the  enemy's 
ships  of  war."  So  familiar  to  them  was  the  existence  of  the  de- 
crees, and  such  their  eagerness  to  give  them  effect  against  our 
commercct  that  they  feigned  a  visitation  to  have  taken  place,  and 
that  notwithstanding  the  express  declaration  of  the  captain 
and  crew  to  the  contrary.  In  addition  to  which  evidence,  Mr. 
Russell's  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  State,  dated  8th  May,  1811, 
says,  "  it  may  not  be  improper  to  remark,  that  no  American  ves- 
"fiel  captured  since  the  1st  of  November,  1810,  has  yet  been  re- 
"  leased." 

From  this  it  is  apparent,  that  the  commanders  of  the  national 
vessels,  the  privateersmen,  and  the  judges  of  the  prize  coutts,  to 
which  may  be  added  also  the  custom  Rouse  officers,  who,  as  the 
instruments  of  carrying  into  effect  the  decrees,  must  have  been 
made  acqusiinted  with  the  repeal  had  it  existed,  have  been  from 


'** 


I' 


H\ 


'■iv 


i 
1 


\> 


I:* 


Hrst  lojast  ignorant  of  any  revocation;    tyul  niiiformly  acted  upojt 
the  principle  of  tlitir  existence. 

If  other  evidence  of  the  continued  existence  of  those  decrees 
were  requisite,  the  acts  of  the  French  f^ovornment  utTord  such  as 
is  full  and  explicit.  Champa^jiiy,  Duke  of  Cadore,  ininifUcr  of 
foreign  relations,  in  his  report  to  his  majesty  the  emperor  and 
kinp,  dated  I'aris,  3d  December,  18  10,  speakinp:  of  the  decrees  of 
Ucrlin  and  Milan,  says  expressly,  "  As  lonj?  as  England  shall  per- 
"  sist  in  her  orders  in  council,  your  majesty  «'///  /icr.n.it  in  your 
^^  dvereen"  than  which  no  declaration  can  be  more  direct  not  on- 
ly that  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  are  unrevoked,  but  that  they 
•wJII  so  remain,  until  the  English  orders  in  council  are  withdrawn. 
And  in  the  address  delivered,  by  his  imperial  majesty  Napoleon, 
to  the  council  of  commerce  on  the  n  1  sfTVIarch,  IHI 1,  he  thus  de- 
elures  "  The  decrees  of  Berlin  and  Milan  arc  the  fundamental 
"laws  of  my  empire.  For  the  neutral  navigation  I- consider  the 
"  flag  as  an  extension  of  territory  The  power,  which  sutlers  its 
"  flag  to  be  violated,  cannot  be  considered  as  neutral.  The  fate 
"  of  the  American  commerce  will  soon  be  decided.  I  will  favor 
"it,  if  the  United  States  conform  thenjselves  to  these  decrees. 
"  In  a  contrary  case,  their  vessels  will  be  driven  from  my  empire." 

And  as  late  as  the  1 0th  of  March  last,  in  a  report  of  the  French 
minister  of  foreign  relations,  communicated  to  the  conservative 
Senate,  it  is  declared,  "that  as  long  as  the  British  orders  in  coun- 
"  cil  arc  not  revoked,  and  the  principles  of  the  treaty  of  Utrecht 
"in  relation  to  neutrals  put  in  force,  the  decrees  of  Berlin  and  Mi- 
"  lar  ought  to  subsist  for  the  powers  who  suffer  their  flag  to  be 
"  denationalized."  In  none  of  these  acts  is  there  any  exception 
in  favor  of  the  United  States.  And  on  the  contrary  in  the  report 
of  March  last,  by  placing  those  decrees  on  the  basis  of  "  the  prin- 
"  ciples  of  the  treaty  of  Utrecht,"  the  French  minister  has  ex- 
tended the  terms  of  revocation  beyond  all  prior  pretensions. 

Those  who  maintain  the  revocation  of  these  decrees,  as  it  re- 
spects the  United  States,  rely  wholly  upon  the  suspension  of  the 
decisions  of  the  French  prize  courts  in  relation  to  some  few  ves- 
sels, and  the  liberation  of  others  by  the  special  direction  of  the 
French  Emperor.  Can  there  be  stronger  presumptive  evidence 
of  the  existence  of  those  decrees  thi.n  this — that  no  vessel  is  ex- 
cepted from  their  operation  until  after  the  special  exercise  of  the 
emperor's  will  in  the  particular  case. 

If  the  decrees  were  cflectively  revoked,  there  would  be  no  cap- 
tures ;  or  if  any  were  made,  liberation  would  be  a  matter  of  course 
and  of  general  riglit,  instead  of  being  an  affair  of  particular  favor 
or  caprice.  Is  it  for  vexations  and  indulgences  like  these,  that 
the  people  of  the  United  States  are  to  abandon  their  com- 
merce and  peace  ?  Is  it  fqf  such  favors  they  arc  to  invite  the  ca- 
lamities of  var  ?  If  the  resources  of  negotiation  were  exhausted, 
had  the  government  no  powers  remaining  to  diminish  the  causes 
of  iu>tloniU   "••ontipvcrsy  by  preventing  abuses  ?    After  this,  had  it 


I 


31 


upuii 


no  powers  to  provide  for  prolcctinR  indisputable  and  iiuporuint 
rijjhts,  \vithout  waging  a  war  of  oflcncc  ?  In  the  regular  exerciHe 
of  legislative  and  executive  powers,  might  not  the  fair  objectH  of 
interest  for  our  country  have  been  secured  coniplc  tely,  by  con- 
tiistcnt  and  wholesome  plans  for  defensive  protection  ?  And  would 
not  a  national  position,  strictly  defensive,  yet  highly  rcspectal)le, 
have  been  less  burthensonu;  to  the  people  than  the  projected 
war  ?  Would  it  not  be  more  friendly  to  the  cause  of  our  own  sea- 
men ;  more  safe  for  our  navigation  and  commerce ;  moie  favora- 
ble to  the  interests  of  our  agriculture;  less  hazardous  to  national 
character;  more  worthy  of  u  people  jealous  of  their  liberty  and 
independence  ? 

For  entering  info  these  hostilities  is  there  any  thing  in  the 
friendship  or  comnicrce  of  Franco  in  its  nature  very  inter- 
esting or  alluring  ?  Will  the  reaping  of  the  scanty  field  of  French 
trade,  which  wc  seek,  in  any  way  compensate  for  the  rich  harvest 
of  general  commerce,  which  by  war  wc  arc  about  to  abandon  ? 
When  entering  into  a  war  with  Great  Britain  for  commercial 
rights  and  interests,  it  seems  impossible  not  to  Inciuire  into  tl>o 
state  of  our  rommerrial  relations  with  France,  and  tlie  advantages 
the  United  States  will  obtain.  Wc  may  thus  be  enabled  to  judgo 
whether  the  prize  is  worth  the  contest. 

By  an  official  statement  made  to  congress  during  the  present 
session,  it  appears  that  of  45,2y'l',000  dollars  of  domestic  produc- 
tions of  the  United  States,  exported  from  September  30th.  1810, 
to  October  1st.  1811,  only  1,191,275  dollars  were  exported  to 
France  and  Italy,  including  Sicily,  not  a  dependency  of  France. 

France  is  now  deprived  of  all  her  foreign  colonics,  and  by  re- 
viewing our  trade  with  that  country  for  several  years  past  and  be- 
fore the  date  of  the  orders  in  council,  it  will  appear  that,  exclu- 
sive of  her  foreign  possessions,  it  has  been  comparatively  incon- 
siderable. The  annexed  statement  marked  A.  taken  from  ofilcial 
documents  shows  the  quantity  of  particular  articles  the  produce 
of  the  United  States  exported  to  all  the  world,  distinguishii)<r  th;; 
amount  both  to  France  and  to  England  and  her  dependencies 'from 
1810  to  1811.  From  this  statement  it  appears,  how  small  a  pro- 
portion of  the  great  staples  of  our  country  is  taken*  by  France. 
While  France  retained  her  colonies,  her  colonial  produce  found 
its  way  to  the  mother  country  through  the  United  States,  and  our 

•  It  .ippears  by  it  lUut  fop  twelve  years  past,  France  fias  not  tukcn  in  ai.v  vi  ar  lui.i  c- 
tliaii  "  • 

f;otton        7,000,000    Pounds      I      Tobacco        10,0<)i»  Hn.^lumli 
If'tc  7,000    Tierces     |      Di-ifcf  Fisli     S7,0ii')  (iufiituli 

Ot  flour,  naval  stores  and  lumber,  none  of  any  iniporlaiKP. 
It  also  appears,  by  it,  that  tlie  annual  averajjc  taken  bv   Franco  for  t\»chc  xoii;. 
was,  of 

Cotton  2,664,090  Pounds      I      Tobacco  5.1)'2r  Hnqslica.Is 

-  - ,  ^  Kice  '■2,-2■y^  Titires     |      Fish  ■j-i,7r..>  Qnilitals 

Of  late  years  some  of  those  arliilcs  have  not  been  shipped  at  all  direellv  to  France 
but  they  have,  probably,  found  tbtif   «:iv   tliillici-  tlnou"!.   ihc   iH.nl.'ein  ur-u  ul 
£\iropo.  '    ' 


il 


*.! 


na 


U'adc  with  her  in  thcHC  urtirks  w;ih  not  iticoiriidcrnblc.  Rut 
nincL-  slic  Ims  hcni  (Icprtvcd  of  licr  loiti^^n  [)<js««ch-.ioiiH,  and  nincc 
the  CHliililishinciit  nl'  licr  niuiicipal  i-c^;(il.aioi)!i  us  to  rtcciicct, 
thin  Hade  liuM  hccii  in  u  ^rcut  di^^rt  c  uiiiiil  .luted.  With  I'citpoct 
to  culoiiiul  pi'udiice  lumc  cuti  l>e  iiii|)()iud  into  l-'rancc  except  tVom 
/idriiculur  fiortn  of  llic  Uiiilcd  Sl.itiH,  uiid  iiin/rr  /i/iniai  im/icr/dl 
iicftici'M.  For  these  licences  our  m<!iThaiii.H  must  puy  what 
titi!  a(;iMitH  of  the  ri-eiu'l)  |i;ovunMneiit  think  pioper  to  deniuiid. 
As  lo  ui'ticles  oi'  >ur  domestic  produce,  they  aw  Ijurllieiicd  witli 
Huch  exorbitant  duUcH,  and  ai'e  huijjecicd  to  Huch  rc^^ulations  and 
restricliojis  on  their  iniportalion  as,  in  ordiiMry  timeu,  will  umounl 
to  u  prohil)ilioi».  On  the  5lli  of  Au!',usl  IHIO,  tlie  very  day  ol"  tiie 
Duke  of  Cudore's  noted  letter,  u  duty  was  impoued  on  all  hcu> 
island  cotton,  imported  into  l''runce,ol'  n\orc  than  ei^^hty  cents  per 
pound,  and  on  other  cotton  of  about  sixty  cents  per  pound, 
MUiounlin^j;  to  three  or  four  times  their  orit:;;iKal  cost  in  the  Unit- 
ed Siutes.  And  js  to  tobacco,  the  Troneli  minister  here  on  the 
23d  of  July  IH  1  I,  informed  our  government,  that  it  was  "  under 
an  adminisirutioii  (en  reL';ie)  in  France  ;  the  administration  (he 
says)  is  the  only  consumer  and  can  purchase  only  the  (|uanu- 
ty  necessary  for  its  consuMipti<jn."  And  by  other  re};ulatioe..i  not 
more  than  out  j!/h  cii'/i  ol  all  the  tobacco  consumed  in  France 
can  be  of  forei^jn  i^r(»wth.  'I'he  onlinary  ([uantity  of  tobacco  an- 
nually consumed  in  France  is  estimated  at  ihirtij  thoimand  hoi^n- 
lu'udn,  leaving  only  about  two  thousand  hoysheads  of  foicign  to- 
bacco to  l)e  purchased  in  France. 

Ill  ailtlitiuii  to  thcito  impositions  iinil  restrielioiis,  t)u>  ioiporter  is  not 
left  tit  liberty  with  respect  tu  his  retiini  ear^-<i.  Uy  other  edicts  he  is 
compelled  ti»  vest  the  avails  of  his  importations,  if,  afliT  paying  duties 
and  seizures,  any  remain,  in  such  uriieles  of  Frencli  produce  and  man- 
ufacture us  the  Preach  uoveriiiiieht  thinks  proper  to  direct.  Two 
thirds  at  least  must  he  luiu  out  in  silks,  and  the  other  third  in  wines, 
brandies,  and  other  articles  of  that  i^oinitry.  To  sliuw  that  (his  aceouni 
of  our  commercial  relations  with  Fraiu'(>  doe>  not  rest  on  douhtful  author- 
ity, the 'undersi.';ned  wouhl  refer  to  the  statements  and  declarations  of 
our  government  on  this  subject.  In  a  letter  from  Mr.  8inith,  the  lato 
Secretary  of  Slate,  to  the  ministef  of  France  here,  of  the  18th  Decem- 
ber 1810,  speaking  of  our  trade  to  that  country,  under  its  regulations, 
after  the  pretended  repeal  of  the  deerees,  Mr.  .Smith  says,  '•  The  re- 
strictions of  the  Berlin  and  Milan  decrees  had  the  eft'eet  of  restraining 
the  American  merchants  from  sendiuii;.  their  vessels  to  France.  Tha 
interdictions  in  the  system  that  has  been  sulistituted,  against  the  ad- 
mission of  American  products,  will  have  the  eft'eet  of  imposing  on 
them  an  equal  restraint." 

'^If  then,  for  the  revoked  decrees,  inunicinal  laws,  producing  th« 
game  commercial  effect,  have  been  substitutetl,  the  mode  only,  and  not 
the  measure,  has  undergone  an  alteration.  And  however  true  it  mar 
be,  that  the  change  is  lawful  in  form,  it  is  nevertheless  as  true,  that  it 
is  essentially  unfriendly,  and  that  it  docs  not  at  all  comport  with  the 
ideas  iaspired  by  your  letter  of  the  ^Tth  ult.  in  which  you  ^ere  pleased 


I  V 


'V 


nut 


?3 

to  (locliiro  4)if  "(1i«tinrtly  prmioiiMoi'il  iiiti>ii(inu  of  1m4  inipcrinl  ninJmfT 
of  t'avitriiii^  lilt*  I'oiiiiiit'icial  i'i'IiiIidiim  IicIui-imi  I'Viiiii't' aiid  tlic  I'liilril 
hliitcH,  in  all  tk'  olijt'cts  ol*  triinic  wlii'-ii  vliiiil  r\  iilnitl^  |irii('('«'(l  IVom 
thi'ir  Hi^riniltiin;  or  iiiaiiiil'iirliircn.*"  "11'  Fiuii«'<>.  \-\  In  r  <t\Mi  acts,  '.uh 
MiK'kailcil  lip  licr  ports  iii;ain>t  tl.r  iiilrotlirlioii  of  tin-  protiiM'tii  ot'llie 
Unilvd  H(ut«'4.  ulial  inotivo  liux  tliJH  i{o\('riiin>'iil,  in  a  <|iMMiiHioii  miiIi 
a  lliiril  power,  to  iiHist  on  thr  piivilc^f  of  irotili;  lo  I'Vaitcc  .-  Wlciu'e 
(he  inilnt'CMii'iit  to  nri;;i'  I  Id*  aniinlnn'iil  of  a  liliM-kadc  of  Iriiiicc.  ulicii, 
if  nnniillc<|,  110  Auifrictin  (Miri^ovs  coniil  ol)iiiiM  a  inml.rt  iii  an)  ol'  in-r 
portH  f  In  Niicli  a  iital<>  of  tliini^s.  a  Itloi'tv^wlf  of  the  niasi  >A'  Iiiiimm' 
woulil  lio,  to  till*  rniti'd  States.  a4  iiiiiiiiporlant,iiH  would  lu'  u  blockixU 
of  lli«'  coiiitt  of  (lie  (^uMiian  nvn." 

Anil  HO  far  lian  the  rrrncli  <'ni]K'rnr  liccn  IV'  ly  r('lr».\In':.  in  wlioln 
or  in  piirtJIii'NC  oilioiiH  rc:;iilalions  um  to  km.  in  I'otiH '(|m<>ih*i>  ol  'nn-N'  li- 
miltinif  to  i;i\e  up  our  Kiii^liAli  triulc,  that  lliey  have  Iic.mi  mad"  .1  nnU- 
ject  of  iipi'cial  inrttniftionH  to  the  ininiMtrr  who  liaH  Imm-ii  ricol  (0  ilto 
court  of  Franpo.  Mr.  Monroi*,  in  his  lottcr  of  inHtnictiom*  to  Mr. 
Burlow,  of  July  -^IW  (Hit,  Hav4«  *'Vonr  early  aiiii  |iiirli<-iiliir  alt*>ntioii 
M'ill  he  drawn  to  (lu*  f;;ivaf  HuhjccI  of  the  coinnifrcial  rclntion,  which  Ir 
to  HuhxiKt,  in  future,  hctwccn  llic  I'nitfd  States  and  France.  Tlie 
PrcHidcnt  expects  that  the  coininerrc  of  the  Ignited  Stales  will  ho 
placed,  in  the  ports  of  France,  on  such  a  foittin.^  as  to  atVoi'd  it  a  fiiir 
market;  and  to  the  industry  and  enterprise  of  their  ciii/ens,  a  reason- 
ahle  cncoiiraiifemi'nt.  An  arran^einenl  to  this  elfect  was  liMd<'(l  for 
immediately  after  the  revocation  of  the  dd-rees,  but  it  appears  fn>  .  the 
documents  in  thiH  department,  that  that  was  not  the  ease;  on  the 
contrary  ^'jHf  onr  cotmnerce  Ikih  htnuiiljertcd  ttt  the  }>;re(tipst  iliscour- 
m«?n^  or  rather  to  the  most  npfnrssive  rt'straints ;  that  the  vessels, 
which  carried  cott'ee,  »i^ar,  &c.  tlioii;;h  sailin:;  direct iy  from  tlie 
United  .States  to  a  French  port,  were  held  in  a  state  of  se(|iiestration, 
on  the  principle  that  the  trade  was  prohibited,  and  tlait  the  importa- 
tion of  these  articles  was  not  only  iinlawfni.  hut  criminal :  that  even 
the  vessels,  which  carried  the  un<jiie.4tionaUle  productions  of  the  United 
States,  were  exposed  to  };reat  ami  expensive  delays,  tu  tedious  investi- 
gations ill  unusual  forms,  and  to  cvovbitant  duties.  In  short,  that  the 
ordinary  usat^es  of  commerce  hot  ween  friendhf  niitinns  \\ere  ahandoned." 

AjEi;ain  Mr.  Monroe,  in  the  same  letter,  says,  "'If  the  ports  of  France 
and  her  allies  arc  not  opened  t«»  the  coinmprce  of  the  rnited  States,  on 
a  liheral  scale  and  on  fair  conditions,  of  wliat  avail  to  <h  >m.  it  may  he 
asked,  will  be  the  revocation  of  the  British  orders  in  cuincil  r  In 
contcndin:;;  for  a  revocation  of  these  orders,  so  far  as  it  was  an  object 
of  interest,  the  United  States  had  in  view  a  trade  to  the  continent. 
It  was  a  fair  let^ilimale  obj«!ct,  and  worth  contending  for,  while  Fraucw 
fMcoura^ed  it.  But  if  she  shuts  her  ports  on  our  ctunmerce,  or  bur- 
dens it  with  heavy  duties,  that  motive  is  at  an  end.''  He  ai^ain  says, 
"  you  will  see  the  injustice,  and  endeavour  to  prevent  (he  necssity.  of 
bringinii;,  in  return  for  American  cargoes  sold  in  France,  an  e(|ual 
amount  in  fAe  pro^MCf  or  »jrtw«fffc^/)vs  of  that  country.  No  such  ob- 
lii;ation  is  imposed  on  French  merchants  tradin:;  to  the  United  States. 
They  enjoy  the  liberty  of  scllini;  their  cargoes  for  casli,  and  takins: 


il 


di 


i  '• 


2i 


i\\ 


s! 


P 

I 
^     I 


:s  k 


b'.^pk  what  they  plrnsc  from  this  (.'ounlry  in  return.  It  i«  iiulis^ioii^nhlc 
ihat  tilt!  trade  be  free,  that  all  Anioncan  citizins  ongai^oil  in  it  be 
phici'd  on  tlic  same  looting,  anil,  wiMitliis  view,  that  tho  sYHtcm  of 
carryinir  it  on,  by  licwses  granted  by  French  agents,  be  immediately 
unniilled." 

The  despatches  from  Mr.  Barlow,  by  the  Hornet,  most  clearly  show, 
that  the  expedutions  of  our  governmeiit  have  not  only  not  been  real- 
ized, but  even  that  the  promises  obtained  liy  oiir  minister  arc  of  a  very 
iinsatisfacton'  nature.  Indeed,  while  Bonaparte  is  sending  armies  to 
the  north  of  Europe,  to  take  possession  of  the  ports  on  the  Baltie,  and 
hy  his  fast-sailing  squadrons  is  burning  American  vessels  on  the  At- 
lantic, all  expectations  of  a  free  trade  from  France  must  be  worse  than 
vain. 

Notwithstanding  the  violence  of  the  belligerents,  were  the  restric- 
tions of  oil)  own  government  removed,  the  commerce  of  the  United 
Stjvtes  might  be  extensive  and  profitable.  It  is  well  known,  that  from 
the  gallantry  of  our  seamen,  if  merchant  vessels  were  allowed  to  arm 
and  associate  for  self-defence,  they  would  be  able  to  repel  many  unlaw- 
ful aggressions.  The  danger  of  capture  would  be  diminished,  and  in 
relation  to  one  of  the  belligerents  at  least,  the  risk,  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, would  soon  be  measured  by  insurance. 

The  discussions  of  our  government  in  relation  to  the  British  orders 
in  council,  give  a  currency  to  the  opinion  that  they  exist,  withoi.  any 
modification,  according  to  the  extent  of  the  first  principles  on  which 
they  ivcre  issued.  And  the  French  ministe"  in  liis  last  communicati-'n 
on  this  subject,  made  to  the  Conservative  Senate  on  the  10th  of  Marc  i 
last,  speaks  o^the  blockade  of  the  10th  of  May,  1806,  "  rts  annihilating 
the  rights  of  all  maritime  states,  and  putting  under  interdiction  whole 
coasts  and  empires  :"  and  of  the  orders  in  council  of  1807  as  though 
btill  snbsistiijg,  and  that  according  to  their  principles  all  vessels  were 
compelled  "  to  pay  a  tribute  to  England,  and  all  cargoes  a  tariff  to  her 
customs."  What  the  real  extent  and  principle  of  the  blockade  of  May, 
480C,  were,  have  already  been  explained.  With  respect  to  the  British 
orders  of  1807,  the  truth'  is,  that  by  a  new  order  issued  on  the  20th  of 
April,  1S09,  they  were  revoked  or  modified,  and  the  obnoxious  transit 
duty,  called  by  the  French  Minister  "  tribute  and  tariff''  was  done 
away.  The  new  order  of  April,  1809,  which  is  now  the  subject  of 
complaint  is  limited  to  ''  all  the  ports  and  places  as  far  north  as  the 
river  Ems,  inclusively,  under  the  government  styling  itself  the  King- 
dom of  Hctland,  and  all  ports  and  places  under  the  government  of 
France,  together  with  the  colonies,  plantations,  and  settlements  in  th*! 
possession  of  those  governments  respectively,  and  all  ports  and  places 
in  the  northern  parts  of  Italy,  to  be  reckoned  from  the  ports  of  Orbitello 
and  Pesaro,  inclusively." 

The  effect  then  of  the  British  orders  of  blockade,  now  in  force,  is  to 
deprive  us  of  the  commerce  of  France,  Holland  and  a  part  of  Italy. 
And  they  leave  open  to  us  the  commerce  of  all  the  rest  of  the  world. 
What  that  is  .:ome  estimate  may  be  formed  by  recurrence  to  the  sub- 
joined table,  which  exhibits  the  state  of  our  commerce  during  1806  and 


I. 


"i^^tm 


nv 
ch 


25 

isoy-  The  two  last  years  antecedent  to  tlic  operation  of  our  restrictive 
system.  By  that  table  it  appears  that  the  value  of  the  exports  of  uur 
domestic  products  to  France,  Holland,  and  Italy  was,  during  those  i\y» 
years,*  at  an  average  only  of  about  six  and  a  half  millions  of  dollars. 
Whereas  the  average  of  our  domestic  exports  to  ,  II  other  parts  of  the 
world,  and  which  are  now  left  free  to  us,  notwithstanding  the  efleet  of 
the  British  orders  in  council, exceed  thirty-eight  millions!  So  extensive  n 
commerce  it  is  proposed  to  surrender  for  the  restricted  trade  the  French 
emperor  will  allow.  A  trade  burdened  by  impositions,  or  hnrrassed  by 
Texutions  from  French  domination  and  French  Itouaniers  or  custom 
house  officers,  in  almost  every  port  of  continental  Europe. 

As  in  the  scale  of  commercial  advantages  France  I?as  iiUlc  to  offer 
in  return  for  the  many  obvious  hazards,  which  according  to  the  wish 
of  her  Emperor  the  United  States  arc  about  to  incur ;  so,  in  the  moral 
estimate  of  national  pj'ospects,  there  is  little  character  to  gain  or  con- 
solation to  expect  in  the  (lark  scene  of  things  on  M'hieh  wCare  entering. 

A  nation,  like  the  United  States,  happy  in  its  great  local  relations  ; 
removed  from  the  bloody  theatre  of  Europe ;  w  ith  a  maritime  border, 
opening  vast  fields  for  enterprize  ; — with  terr/orial  possessions,  ex- 
ceeding every  real  want ; — its  firesides  safe ; — its  altars  titidetiled  ; — 
from  invasion  nothing  to  fear; — from  acquisition  nothing  to  hope; — 
how  shall  sueh  a  nation  look  to  heaven  for  its  smiles,  while  throwing 
away,  as  thongh  they  w  ere  worthless,  all  the  blessings  and  joys,  which 
peace  and  such  a  distinguished  lot  include  ?  With  Avhat  prayers  can 
it  address  the  Most  High,  when  it  prepares  to  pour  forth  its  youthful 
rage  upon  a  neighbouring  people ;  from  whose  strength  it  has  nothing 
to  dread,  from  whose  devastation  it  has  nothing  to  gain  } 

If  our  ills  were  of  a  nature  that  war  would  remedy;  if  war  would 
compensate  any  of  our  losses,  or  remove  any  of  our  complaints,  tliore 
might  be  some  alleviation  of  the  suffering,  in  the  charm  of  the  prospect. 
But  how  will  war  upon  the  land  protect  commerce  upon  the  ocean  ? 
What  balm  has  Canada  for  wounded  honour  P  How  are  our  mariners 
beneflted  by  a  war  which  exposes  those  who  are  free,  without  promis- 
ing release  to  those  who  are  impressed  ? 


\: 


f  1 


pi 


*  Value  of  articles  of  doraestic  prodaec  exiiovted  to  all  tlie  world. 


In  ISOf). 
W:>.ole  Amount  §41,253,727 


To  France  3,226,698 
To  HcUand,  now 

part  of  France  3,609,964 

To  Italy  185,,j40 

7,022,008 


To  England  and 

dependoiicits       19,179,981 
To  all  other  parts 

ol  ibc  Morld         lf»,05 1,740 


.'5i,'.\31,7-2l 


III  1807. 
Wbole  Amouut  §48,609,592 


2,716,141 

3,098,234 
i.':)0,2J7 

6,064,6.3iJ 


27,915,077 
14,719,883 
42,631,960 


n 


46 


I  >'. 


r  i 


I 


3 


But  it  is  said  that  wnr  is  demanded  by  honour.  Is  national  honour  a 
principle  which  thirsts  after  venoeance,  and  is  appeased  only  by  blood ; 
which,  trampling  on  the  hopes  of  man,  and  spurning  the  law  of  Qod, 
untaught  by  what  is  past  ttnd  careless  of  what  is  to  come,  precipitates 
itself  into  any  folly  or  madness,  to  gratify  a  selfish  vanity,  or  to  satiate 
some  unhallowed  rage  ?  If  honour  demands  a  war  with  England,  what 
•  piute  lulls  that  honour  to  sleep  over  the  wrongs  done  us  by  France  ? 
On  land,  robberies,  seizures,  imprisonments,  by  French  authority ;  at 
tea,  pillage,  sinkings,  burnings,  under  Frencn  orders.  These  are  no- 
torious. Are  they  unfelt  because  they  are  French  ?  Is  any  alleviation 
to  be  found  in  the  correspondence  and  humiliations  of  the  present  Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary  of  the  United  States  at  the  French  court  ?  In  his 
communications  to  our  government,  as  before  the  public,  where  is  the 
eause  for  now  selecting  France  as  the  friend  of  our  country,  and  Eng- 
land as  the  enemy  P 

If  no  illusions  of  personal  feclins;,  and  no  solicitude  for  elevation  of 

Slace,  should  be  permitted  to  misguide  the  public  councils;  ii'it  is  in- 
eed  honourable  for  the  true  statesman  to  consult  the  public  welfare, 
to  provide  in  truth  for  the  public  defence,  and  impose  no  yoke  of 
bondage ;  with  full  knowledge  of  the  wrongs  inflicted  by  the  French, 
ought  the  government  of  this  country  to  aid  the  French  cause,  by  en- 
gaging in  war  against  the.enemy  of  France  P  To  supply  the  waste  of 
such  a  war,  and  to  meet  the  appropriations  of  millions  extraordinary 
for  the  war  expenditures,  must  our  fellow-citizens  tliroughout  the 
Union  be  doomed  to  sustain  the  burden  of  war-taxes,  in  various  forms 
of  direct  and  indirect  imposition  P  For  otficial  information,  respecting 
the  millions  deemed  requisite  for  charges  of  the  war ;  for  like  informa- 
tion, respecting  the  nature  and  amount  of  taxes,  deemed  requisite  for 
drawing  those  millions  from  the  comniunif.y,  it  is  here  suflicient  to  refer 
to  estimates  and  reports  made  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  and 
the  Committee  of  Ways  and  Means,  and  to  the  body  of  resolutions, 
passed  in  March  last  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 

It  would  be  some  relief  to  our  anxiety,  if  amends  were  likely  to 
be  made,  for  the  weakness  and  wiidness  of  the  project  by  the  prudence 
of  the  preparation.  Bet  in  no  aspect  of  this  anomalous  affair  can  we 
trace  the  great  and  distinctive  properties  of  wisdom.  There  is 
seen  a  headlong  rushing  into  difficulties,  with  little  calculation  about 
the  means  and  little  concern  about  the  consequences.  With  a  navy 
comparatively  nominal,  we  are  about  to  enter  into  the  lists  against  the 
greatest  marine  on  the  globe.  With  a  commerce  unprotected  and 
spread  ovev  every  oeean,  we  propose  to  make  profit  by  privateering,  and 
for  this  endanger  the  wealth  of  which  we  are  honest  proprietors.  An 
invasion  is  threatened  of  the  colonies  of  a  power,  which^  without  put- 
ting a  new  ship  into  commission,  or  taking  another  soldier  into  pay, 
can  spread  alarm  or  desolation  along  the  extensive  range  of  our  sea- 
board. The  resources  of  our  country,  in  their  natural  state,  great  be- 
yond our  wants  or  our  hopes,  are  impaired  by  the  effect  of  artificial 
restraints.  Before  adequate  fortifications  are  prepared  fur  domcslie 
defence,  before  men  or  money  arc  provided  for  a  w  ar  of  attack,  why 


I    » 


honour  a 
by  blood ; 

of  God, 
Bcipitates 
to  satiate 
xnd,  what 

France  ? 
)rity ;  at 
le  are  no- 
Ueviation 
sent  Min- 
t  ?  In  his 
ere  is  the 
and  £ng- 

evation  of 
f  it  is  in- 
e  welfare, 
t  yoke  of 
e  French, 
ise,  by  en- 
e  waste  of 
■aordinary 
p;hout  the 
ious  forms 
respecting 
e  iiubrma- 
[}uisite  for 
!nt  to  refer 
usury  and 
^solutions, 

J  likely  tO' 
prudence 
lir  can  we 
There  is 
tion  about 
h  a  navy 
gainst  the 
ected  and 
ering,  and 
tors.  An 
thout  put- 
into  pay, 
four  sea- 
,  great  be- 
f  artificial 
domcslie 
tack,  why 


iff 

hasten  into  the  midst  of  that  awful  contest  which  is  laying  waste  Eu- 
rope? It  cannot  be  concealed,  that  to  engage,  in  the  present  war,  ai^ninst 
England,  is  to  place  ourselves  on  the  side  of  France ;  and  exposes  iis 
to  tlie  vassalage  of  states  serving  under  the  banners  of  the  French  Em- 
peror. 

The  undersigned  cannot  refrain  from  asking,  what  are  the  United 
States  to  gain  by  a  war  ?  Will  the  gratification  of  some  privateersmeu 
compensate  the  nation  for  that  sweep  of  our  legitimate  commerce  by 
the  extended  marine  of  our  enemy,  which  tliis  desperate  act  invites.'' 
Will  Canada  flompensate  the  midolc  states  forNew-Tork,  or  the  Mcst- 
ern  states  for  New-Orleans  P  I^e'  us  not  be  deceived.  A  war  of  iuvattiuu 
may  invite  a  retort  of  invasion.  When  we  visit  the  peaceable,  and,  as 
to  us,  innocent  colonies  of  Great  Britain  with  the  horrors  of  war,  can 
we  be  assured  that  our  own  coast  wiU  not  be  visited  with  like  horrors  ? 

At  a  crisis  of  the  world  such  as  (he  present,  and  under  impressions 
such  as  these,  the  undersigned  could  not  consider  the  war,  in  which  the 
United  States  have  in  secret  been  precipitated,  as  necessary,  or  required 
by  any  moral  duty,  or  any  political  expediency. 

GEORGE  SULLIVAN, 
MARTIN  CHITTENDEN, 
ABIJAH  BIGELOW, 
ELIJAH  BRIGHAM, 
WILLIAM  ELY, 
JOSIAH  QUINCY, 
WILLIAM  .REED, 
SAML.  TAGGART, 
LABAN  WHEATON, 
LEONARD  WHITE, 
RICHARD  JACKSON,  Jun. 
ELISHA  R.  POTTER, 
EPAPHRODITUS  CHAMPION, 
JNO.  DAVENPORT,  Jun. 
LYMAN  LAW, 
JONA.  O.  MOSELEY, 
TIMO.  PITKIN,  Jun. 
LEWIS  B.  STURGES, 
BENJAMIN  TALLMADGE, 
H.  BLEECKER, 
JAMES  EMOTT, 


/'! 


in 


i 


»  i^*.^-«' 


m¥ 


. 

. 


i  <{  f 


t: 


ASA  FITCH, 
TH08.  R.  GOLD, 
JAMES  MILNOR, 
H.  M.  RIDGELY, 
C.  GOLDSBOROUGH, 
PHILIP  B.  KEY, 
PHILIP  STUART, 
JOHN  BAKER, 
JAMES  BRECKENRIDGE, 
JOS.  LEWIS,  Jun. 
THOS.  WILSON, 
A.  M'BRYDE, 
JOS.  PEARSON. 


!  ?i 


h 


V 


[4 


M 


NOTE  A. 

Quantity  of  fiarticular  articiea,  the  firoduce  of  the  United  Str>tts,  ex- 
/lor ted  from  1800  to  1811,  viz  : 


COTTON. 

To  allfiarta  of  the  nvorld. 

To  France. 

To  England. 

lbs. 

lbs. 

lbs. 

18.00 

17,789,803 

none. 

16,179,513 

18U1 

20,911,201 

844,728 

18,953,005 

1802 

27,501,075 

1,907,849 

23,473,925 

1803 

41,105,623 

3,821,840 

27,757,307 

1804 

38,118,041 

5,946,848 

25,770,748 

1805 

40,383,491 

4,504,329 

32,571,071 

1806 

37,491,282 

7,082,118 

24,256,457 

1  or 

66,612,737 

6,114,358 

53,180,211 

,  JOS 

12,064,346 

2,087,450 

7^92,593 

1809* 

53,210,225 

ncne  diiect. 

13,365,987 

1810t 

93,874,201 

do. 

36,171,915 

iSllt 

62,186 

do. 
RICE. 

46,872,452 

To  allfiarta  of  the  world. 

To  France, 

To  England  Isf  Colo 

Tierces. 

Tierces, 

Tierces. 

1800 

112,056 

none. 

77,547 

1801 

94,866 

2,724 

65,022 

1802 

79,822 

7,186 

37,393 

1803 

81,838 

3,116 

33,200 

1804 

78,385 

6,014 

24,975 

1805 

56,830 

1,601 

24,737 

1806 

102,627 

3,392 

39,298 

1807 

.     .     94,692 

3,006 

37,417 

1808 

9,228 

none  direct. 

4,298 

1809 

116,907 

do. 

32,138 

1810 

131,341 

do. 

31,118 

1811 

!  19,356 

do. 

40,045 

I 


i 


*  In  1809,  in  consequence  of  the  embargo  and  non-intercourse  act, 
4  millions  pounds  of  Cotton  were  shipped  for  Madeira,  10  and  a  half 
millions  to  the  Floridas,  6  millions  to  Fayal  and  other  Azores,  1  mil- 
lion and  three  quarters  to  Portugal,  and  10  millions  to  Sweden. 

t  1810,  about  4  millions  of  pounds  of  Cotton  were  shipped  for 
Spain,  3  millions  for  Portugal,  3  millions  for  Madeira,  10  millions 
for  Floridas,  2  millions  for  Europe  generally,  4  millions  for  Fayal 
and  the  Azores,  14  millions  for  Denmark  and  Norway,  and  5  mil- 
lions for  Sweden. 

\  In  1 8 1 1  ,9  millions  of  pounds  of  Cotton  were  shipped  for  Russia, 


IM'   :  '.Uf  Wll  IWII|l|JI||l|p| 


ii|iiiiii  unvcmiHaiiiuij 


II 


1 


• 

10 

•••»••• 

TOBACCO. 

To 

all  partn  qf  the  world. 

To  Franc:,     To  England  b*  Colo, 

Hhds. 

Hhds. 

Hhds. 

1800 

78,680 

143 

37,798 

1801 

103,758 

5,006 

55,256 

1802 

77,731 

16,316 

39,938 

1803 

86,391 

9,815 

47,839 

1804 

83,343 

14,633 

24,700 

1805 

71,252 

13,135 

18,169 

1806 

8^,186 

9,182 

26,273 

1807 

63,233 

2,876 

33,047 

1808 

9,576 

566 

2,536 

1809 

53,931 

none  direct. 

8,965 

1810 

84,134 

do. 

24,067 

1811 

35,838 

569 

20,343 

FISH,  Diied  or  Smoked. 

To  Mfiartt  (if  the  world 

To  France.     To  England  ist  Colo. 

Quintals. 

Quintals. 

Quintals. 

1800 

392,727 

Ji6ne. 

141,420 

1801 

410,948 

1,687 

111,030 

1802 

440,935 

87,067 

92,679 

1803 

461,870 

3,491 

71,495 

1804 

507,838 

3,765 

76,822 

1805 

514,549 

73,004 

55,676 

1809 

537,457 

19,347 

66,377 

1807 

473,924 

87,654 

55,242 

1808 

155,808 

16,144 

26,998 

1809 

345,643 

none. 

66,566 

1810 

380,804 

3,150 

55,456 

^811 

316,387 

28,623 

33,242 

PICKLED  FISH. 
None  exported  to  Europeo-i  France. 

FLOUR. 


To  allfiarta  qfthe 

world. 

To  France. 

To  England  is^  Colo 

Bbls. 

Bbls. 

Bbls. 

1800                 653,052 

none. 

365,7^9 

1801              1,193,444 

none. 

758,023 

1802              1,156,248 

14,638 

484,886 

1803              1,311,853 

18,045 

502,006 

1804                 810,008 

1,074. 

258,515 

ttm«s^ 


'  <Hlil»f  TMP|llJ«!i|J*!"  WMiPllH  'X  m  'WU . 


wmrtD     %!  <^};(jiiv«HJii  iijuiLii  iHujji  i_\^ftmmmm''.JWAI 


tl 


SI 


1805 

777,513 

none. 

235,176 

1806 

782,724 

none. 

308,048 

i8or 

1,249,819 

nonet 

619,918 

1808 

263,813 

none. 

73,084 

1809 

846,247 

none. 

230,822 

1810 

798,431 

none. 

192,477 

1811 

1,445,012 

3,966 

375,534 

NAVAL  STORES.— TAR. 

To 

allfiarta  of  the  world. 

To  France.     To 

England  Isf  Colo 

Bbls. 

Bbls. 

Bbls. 

1800 

59,410 

none. 

58,793 

1801 

67,487 

none. 

62,632 

1802 

37,497 

797 

21,330 

1803 

78,989 

none. 

75,295 

1804 

58,181 

do. 

45,210 

1805 

72,745 

do. 

59,439 

1806 

62,723 

do. 

50,663 

1807 

59,282 

do. 

51,232 

1808 

18,764 

do. 

17,700 

1809 

128,090 

do. 

33,072 

18iO 

87,310 

do. 

50,021 

1811 

i49,796 

do. 

123,034 

I 


TURPENTINE. 


1800 

53,129 

do. 

32,580 

1801 

35,413 

do. 

35,143 

18«2 

38,764 

do. 

36,769 

1803 

61,178 

do. 

60,732 

1804 

77,825 

do. 

76,950 

1805 

95,640 

do. 

94,328 

1806 

74,731 

do. 

71,854 

1807 

53,451 

do. 

52,107 

1808 

17,061 

do. 

17,009 

1809 

77,398 

do. 

22,885 

1810 

62,912 

do. 

36,995 

1811 

1 

100,242 

do. 

97,250 

\,  * 


m 


■i^' 


..its'* 


i 


il 


j 


I 


1 

% 

•< 

1 

^ 

• 

<M 

LUMBER. 

—     .  k   . 

or  the  vast  quanlitiea 

of  Lumber  exported 

from  1800  to  1811, 

only  a  few  Stavea  and  Head'ng  went  to  France, 

as  follows. 

VIZ : 

Thouaanda  of  Stavca  and  Heading. 

1             ^ 

1801 

6,349 

1803 

357 

J    • 

1804 

321 

1805 

466 

1806 

716 

1807 

614 

1808 

• 

105 

• 

1- , '. 

1  -"^>  i  ■ 

,.■1 


"^Tnu 


.^' 


I  1811, 


II 


1^1 


1  h  .' 


\ 


